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The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry be
Bound by the Chains of Government Regulation?
David Favre
Matthew McKinnon
"Eppur si muove"
- Galileo Galilei1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Prometheus of ancient lore stole fire from the gods, delivering
it to mankind to allow men to protect themselves from Zeus.2 Today,
science, like the mythical Titan, is discovering the secrets of the
universe and delivering them to mankind for its betterment. For Pro-
metheus' efforts in helping an unworthy mankind, Zeus had him chained
to a crag in Scythia at the ends of the earth. Will the government of
today demand an equivalent price of science? In return for the benefits
of fire, Zeus extracted a heavy price from mankind: he sent them Pan-
dora's box filled with evil, disease, and hardship. Will the price that
present society pays for the benefits of science be equally high?
Until recently there has been very little desire expressed to control
science. Society has been indifferent to the activities of scientists in
their labs and has generally accepted the benefits of science. Never-
theless, it is recognized that the process as well as the product of
science can present society with potential risks of harm.
Consider for a moment some of the various areas with which science
is grappling: the deciphering of the genetic code of the DNA molecule, 3
the creation of human life outside the womb,' research on fetal
EDITOR's NOTE: The authors are professors of law at The Detroit College of Law.
David S. Favre, B.S. (Chemistry), University of Virginia (1968); J.D., College of William
and Mary (1973). Matthew C. McKinnon, B.S. (Physics), University of Detroit (1961), J.D.
Detroit College of Law (1972).
1. "And yet it does move." Legend has it that Galileo muttered this defiantly in
response to the demand of the Inquisition that he repudiate the Copernican Heliocentric
Theory of the Universe. This phase marked but the first round in the continuing confron-
tation between the truth-seeking enterprise of scientific inquiry and the government. See
W. DURANT & A. DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON BEGINS 600-12 (1961).
2. See E. TRIPP, HANDBOOK OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 499-501 (1970).
3. See notes 220-27 and accompaning text infra.
4. See note 165 and accompanying text infra for a discussion on external human fer-
tilization.
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development,' and determining the biochemistry of the brain.' Each of
these activities has created new risks of harm which could arise out of
the new knowledge itself (or its misapplication),7 or from the carrying
out of an experiment. As a result of the original research on recombi-
nant DNA, there arose an awareness of these new risks which impose
the possibility of physical injury to the public at large. This awareness
gave rise to the government's first real attempt to control scientific
experimentation.'
5. See notes 200-13 and accompanying text infra.
6. Science is just beginning to understand the biological system known as the
human mind. The interaction of billions of neuron cells as well as innumerable hormones is
the most complex entity man has considered. See generally R. RESTACK, THE BRAIN, THE
LAST FRONTIER (1979); P. RUSSELL, THE BRAIN BOOK (1979). Legal issues are beginning to
arise because, as knowledge increases, so does the ability to manipulate the mind. As an
alternative to our present penal system, one sociologist proposes to make use of advances
in knowledge of the human mind:
It might be possible to trace priority structures in the brain and selectively erase
or replace inappropriate priorities in much the same manner that one edits a com-
puter program by erasing unneeded subprograms and routines. Although one effect
would be some memory loss, a totally different feeling and priority structure and
concomitant personality change could be achieved. It also could be possible to edit
memory structures selectively and arrange either short- or long-term memory loss
without disabling consequences.
Techniques of brain editing are potentially the most effective means of in-
capacitating known offenders from committing future crimes.
Lebtinen, Controlling the Minds and Bodies of Prisoners- Without Prisons, BARRISTER,
Fall, 1979, at 13.
7. Some states made the judgment that the study of Darwin's theory of evolution
was dangerous to the school children of the state and passed laws to preclude the
teaching of this concept. In Tennessee, this resulted in the infamous Scopes Monkey Trial.
See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The United States Supreme
Court overturned similar legislation in Arkansas. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
8. On September 21, 1973, Science published a letter signed by Maxine Singer and
Dieter Soll addressed to the presidents of the National Academy of Sciences and the
Academy's Institute of Medicine. The letter read in part as follows:
We are writing to you, on behalf of a number of scientists, to communicate a mat-
ter of deep concern. Several of the scientific reports presented at this year's Gor-
don Research Conference on Nucleic Acids ... indicated that we have the technical
ability to join together ... DNA molecules from diverse sources ....
Certain such hybrid molecules may prove hazardous to laboratory workers and to
the public. Although no hazard has yet been established, prudence suggests that
the potential hazard be seriously considered.
Singer & Soll, Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973).
In 1974,. scientists engaged in recombinant DNA research called for a voluntary
moratorium on certain experiments, and outlined guidelines to control such research. Letter
from Berg, et al., 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974). After further debate and meetings, the National
Institute of Health (NIH) released a set of guidelines in June, 1976. National Institutes of
Health, Recombinant DNA Research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,911 (1976). For proposed
revised guidelines, see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978).
Scientific Inquiry
Counterbalancing this new desire to control science, are several
equally important societal interests. Society has a long-standing inter-
est in the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the free flow of such
information,9 as well as the preservation of the maximum number of
choices for an individual."0 Finally, the development of new technology
is dependent upon unrestrained scientific inquiry, and without continu-
ing technological growth, development within the areas of health care,
employment, business, and defense will stagnate. These above policies,
considered within the framework of our constitutional system, support a
strong argument for a constitutional right of scientific inquiry.
During the past decade there have been several instances in which
the government has imposed restraints upon scientific inquiry"
without giving full consideration to the existence of such a right. The
existence of a right would place substantial limitations upon govern-
mental activity, and must be considered before any meaningful scheme
of regulation can be adopted. It is the purpose of this article to lay the
foundation by proposing that there exists a constitutional right of
scientific inquiry. It will be shown that such an activity can be pro-
tected as speech or a necessary incident to speech under the first
amendment, or as an unique freedom entitled to protection as a fun-
damental right similar to the right of privacy or the right to travel.
Before undertaking the constitutional analysis, this article will set
forth a legal definition of the term scientific inquiry. 2 Such a definition
is necessary in order to predict which activities fall within the scope of
the protected right.3 In formulating this definition, the nature of
science and the complexity of the scientific process will first be ex-
amined. From this analysis the essential elements of the process will
be gleaned and used to derive a suitable legal definition.
Having established the legal definition of science and the scope of
the right of scientific inquiry, this article will discuss the judicial
standards for review. It is at this stage that the crucial balance be-
9. See notes 71-79 and accompanying text infra.
10. As one author has noted, this freedom is particularly important to the scientist:
The freedom to choose his own problem is the scientist's most precious posses-
sion. At the cutting edge of science, on the frontiers of knowledge, nature confronts
the scientist with a tangled obscurity which he can hope to penetrate only occa-
sionally and with the most intense and dedicated effort. This kind of effort comes of
devotion born of free choice, and scientists have therefore resisted external
restraints and blandishments.
B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 49 (1966).
11. Examples would include recombinant DNA research, fetal research, and human
experimentation.
12. Prior commentators in this area have failed to articulate such a definition. See,
e.g., note 49 infra.
13. This is not to say that other human activities such as inventing or economics
might not also be entitled to constitutional protection.
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tween the competing societal interests must be struck. Such difficult
problems as national defense,1 ' human experimentation, 5 fetal
research,"6 and recombinant DNA research17 will be considered as ex-
amples.
II. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
The following is a primer for the non-scientist, an introduction to
the process by which science develops new ideas and concepts. This
discussion is important to sensitize the reader to the complexity and
the fundamental nature of the scientific process. Before a legal defini-
tion of scientific inquiry or a discussion of the related constitutional
right can be meaningful, some grasp of the process from the scientist's
viewpoint is essential.
A. The Scientist's Definition
While it is possible to give short definitions of science, it is difficult
for the non-scientist to gain significant insight into the process of
scientific inquiry from them. Nevertheless, such definitions will pro-
vide a useful starting point for discussion.
Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel laureate, has suggested the following
definition:
The profession of science is the search for truths about the natural
world; more precisely, it seeks verifiable generalizations that simplify
human comprehension and prediction of natural phenomena. Still more
must be said: the truths must be novel and significant-which is to
suggest that they are measured according to their impact on the minds
of other scientists, a statement which labels science firmly as a human
and social enterprise.'8
It should be noted that when Dr. Lederberg uses the word "truth" it
does not denote a good or bad quality but a scientific "truth"; i.e., that
which is subject to empirical verification.
In his book, The New Priesthood, Ralph E. Lapp describes science
slightly differently:
The goals of science focus upon the exploration of the unknown and the
enlargement of knowledge. Very often the greatest discoveries come
when a man sees relationships between things which no one recognized
before-or sees these in a new light. But usually science expands into
14. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 187-93 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 200-13 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 220-29 and accompanying text infra.
18. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 599
(1972). Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1958.
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the unknown like a hugh amoeba, moving first this way and then that,
seeking the virgin and the fertile. Its goals are determined by oppor-
tunity and chance, and sometimes design.9
Finally, J. Bronowski, arguing that science at its highest level is an
extremely creative human process, has offered the following definition:
All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses ....
The scientist looks for order in the appearances of nature by explor-
ing such likenesses ....
The progress of science is the discovery at each step of a new order
which gives unity to what had long seemed unlike. Faraday did this
when he closed the link between electricity and magnetism. Clark Max-
well did it when he linked both with light. Einstein linked time with
space, mass with energy, and the path of light past the sun with the
flight of a bullet ....
As can be seen in the above definitions, science is the search for
knowledge of how and why the universe around us functions." The pro-
cess by which this knowledge is acquired is as complex as, and indeed
might be considered parallel to, the development of the human mind.
At times the process involves merely mechanical data gathering or
tedious computation, but, like art, it is also a creative process in which
the scientist, like the artist, seeks to provide some new insight or a dif-
ferent, broader, perspective of nature.'
In addition, science is a social activity.' The growth of scientific
knowledge is heavily dependent upon the interchange of ideas among
scientists, both contemporaries and predecessors. The scientist who
makes a "breakthrough" not only "stands on the shoulders of giants,
and hence can see a little farther," but he perceives reality subject to
all of the strengths and weaknesses of this colleagues."
B. The Parallel Between Human Development and Scientific Growth
In many ways, the process by which scientific knowledge has ad-
vanced over the centuries is similar to the process by which each in-
19. R. LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD 1-2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAPP].
20. J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 13-15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
HUMAN VALUES].
21. See J. BRONOWSKI, THE ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE]; T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION (1969) [hereinafter cited as KUHN].
22. HUMAN VALUES. supra note 20, at 3-20.
23. Zimar, What is Science? in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
11-12 (A. Michalos ed. 1974).
24. It has been suggested that while Robinson Crusoe might have engaged in
religious and technological activities, he could not have engaged in scientific and/or legal
activities without fellow humans available to take part. Id at 12; see also ORIGINS OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 21, at 122-38.
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dividual human being assimilates information to produce a working
model of the world around him. It is a process that begins at birth and
continues until death.'
Consider the newborn infant. While his state of self-awareness is
non-existent, the pain of hunger is real and it is only eliminated with
the consumption of a liquid provided from a source that will soon be
labeled "mommy." The infant knows nothing about the milk itself, but
does enjoy the social contact of the feeding and prefers a stomach full
rather than empty. At this stage, the infant's knowledge approximates
the level of science that existed prior to the formation of civilizations
or societies. It receives sensory data and instinctively does that which
is necessary for survival, but does not know, and is incapable of asking,
why things are the way they are.
Within a few months, the child begins to eat a diversity of foods.
This increase in sensory data results in different classifications or
categories of food. Even though these first distinctions may not be ver-
balized, anyone who has observed a young child recognizes the func-
tioning of the categories in the acceptance and rejection of different
foods or the same foods under different conditions. Foods may be
sweet, sour, salty, spicy, hot, or cold. Additionally, they can be
categorized by physical state-liquid, solid, or lumpy. The child will ac-
cept food in one state, but not another. Still, the child does not under-
stand the real source or function of food. As with science, classification
of observable data into various categories is the first step in the pro-
cess of knowledge." As a child develops, visual data provides a new
perspective of foods. The child observes that the parent is not the
source of food. Rather the refrigerator, the cabinet, or even the super-
market is believed to be the source. Food is thus seen in a broader con-
text.
Within a year or two the child begins to develop a powerful tool
that will aid in his understanding of food: the tool of communication.
25. Since the mind of the scientist is the ultimate source of scientific knowledge, a
study of the development of science as a human endeavor is inextricably intertwined with
the capabilities of the human mind. Thus, to understand the capabilities and maturation of
the individual is to understand the process of science.
26. Aristotle's physics started not from theory or definitions, but from observations
of the distinctions between products of nature and products of art. F. WOODBRmGE.
ARISTOTLE'S VISION OF NATURE 65 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WOODBRIDGE]. See generally
W. DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE 134-41, 526-31 (1939). For example, Aristotle believed
that the different kinds of matter could be distinguished by their different observable
physical properties. All things were composed of four basic elements or combinations
thereof: earth possessed the properties of cold plus dryness, water combined cold with
dampness, air possessed heat plus dampness, and fire combined heat with dryness. R.
STEARNS, SCIENCE IN THE BRITISH COLONIES OF AMERICA 9 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
STEARNS].
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This is the first and foremost tool of science or any other human in-
stitution and, indeed, the beginning of an organized society can be traced
to the increasing ability of its individuals to communicate.' Com-
munication allows the individual, child or scientist, to learn what
others have observed, multiplying many times the raw data from
which knowledge will grow. It must be understood that all knowledge
is limited by the availability of data. The farmer's child has observed
the seeds and plants that produce vegetables, whereas the urban child
does not have that opportunity, and cannot possess this data unless it
is obtained by communication with parents, through books, or via
television. Having acquired this new knowledge, the child's
understanding of the source of his food also changes. He no longer
perceives as the source his parents or the refrigerator, but learns that
food comes plants and animals.
The next step that the child may take is of particular importance in
the analogy to science. As described above in Bronowski's definition, it
is the finding of likeness in that which was previously believed
dissimilar. The urban/suburban child in America has two sets of obser-
vations which, at least initially, are not tied together. An example of
the first is the awareness of beef being part of his family's normal diet.
The second is an awareness of a cow as a farm animal, that she has big
brown eyes and says "moo." These observations may co-exist within
the child's mind for a period of time, but at some point the child will
realize that the same cows that he or she admired in pleasant pastoral
settings are killed and consumed by humans.' Those facts which had
co-existed separately were found to be related. The same process is
very important to the growth of science. It took an Einstein to see the
common denominator between energy and mass, both of which were
27. See R. LEAKEY & R. LEWIS, ORIGINS 178-206 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ORIGINS].
28. History suggests that early scientific data gathering was similarly limited. Early
fact gathering was usually a random process that resulted in a pool of facts containing
data from (1) casual observation, (2) wide experiments, and (3) established crafts such as
medicine or metallurgy. For example, Bacon's writings are typical of this early approach
in that they contain observations which are inconsistent or lacking sufficient detail. See
KUHN, supra note 21, at 15-16.
Science in Colonial America operated at about the same level as the typical child. During
this time scientists pursued three broad objectives: the collection of data, classification of
data, and nomenclature. Few if any experiments as we know them today were carried out.
STEARNS, supra note 26, at 6-8.
29. Santa Claus is another classic example of a child's realization or analysis of con-
flicting coexistent facts. This is slightly different from the cow example because of the
strong cultural position that promoted belief in Santa Claus. Nevertheless, at some point
in time the facts overcome the myth.
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well known to scientists prior to Einstein's realization of the interrela-
tionship.-
As the child develops further, those categories by which food had
previously been classified are no longer sufficient to satisfy the child's
intellectual curiosity. For while these classifications describe the
physical characteristics of food, they do not help to explain what food
does in the body or to determine why some foods might be more
beneficial for consumption than others. The questions why and how
now become important. Through information gathered from parents,
contemporaries, or teachers, the child learns of the components of food:
calories, proteins, carbohydrates, vitamins, and minerals.
By adding this new method of food classification to his working in-
formation, the child is capable of making more knowledgeable decisions
as to what foods his body needs. Likewise, science often finds existing
systems of classification inadequate when faced with new information.
The new information does not discredit the previous classification,
rather it demands that an additional system be created to take the
new knowledge into account. When scientists first dealt with air pollu-
tion from a smoke stack, they determined the degree of pollution by
opacity. As knowledge of pollutants became more sophisticated, it
became apparent that other emissions could not be categorized by
opacity and additional criteria had to be developed. 1
At this point in the child's development he must move beyond his
day-to-day experiences to acquire more knowledge about food and its
relationship to human existence. He must actively seek detailed
knowledge about this particular topic. This level of understanding
represents what must be the vast majority of human effort in the
scientific process: the refining of existing ideas, the seeking of better
and more data while working within existing scientific theories and
paradigms.2 The student will learn that a calorie represents energy
potential which is stored in the fat cells of the human body. He will
30. This relationship as finally articulated by Einstein is expressed by the equation
E =mc'. See RELATIVITY THEORY: ITS ORIGINS AND IMPACT ON MODERN THOUGHT 85 (L.
Williams ed. 1968).
31. The residue of the old approach can be found in most state air pollution laws or
regulations. For example, the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission prohibits any
emission of a density darker than No. 1.0 of the Ringelmann chart or not more than 20%
opacity. This rule is very seldom used because of the difficulty of proving a violation. Today in-
dustrial smoke emissions are considered under the general categories of particulate matter,
sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, ozones, hydrocarbons, nitrogen dioxide, and lead, and are
measured by concentration in the air not opacity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.12 (1980).
32. Paradigms are accepted models or examples of actual scientific practice. They in-
clude law, theory, application, and instrumentation. "Copernican astronomy," "Newtonian
mechanics," or "wave optics" are examples of paradigms. KUHN, supra note 21, at 10-11,
187-91.
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discover that proteins are constructed from building blocks called
amino acids, and that amino acids are built in accordance with the
specifications of DNA molecules found in the genes of different life
forms.
The student's ability to gain this knowledge is a function of com-
munication with those who have spent a lifetime seeking information
and of the growth of the underlying technological support that allows
better and more sophisticated data to be gathered. The various scien-
tific fields interrelate; for example, the ability of the biologist was
limited by the development of knowledge in the field of optics. Thus,
until physicists advanced the understanding of light and optics, the
equipment available to the biologist was limited.'
The final step that our student will take is not to acquire a more
detailed knowledge of food, but to set it in a broader perspective: to
see how food relates to other human and natural activities. It is im-
possible to predict which individuals will be able to go on to this next
step in the process. It does not appear to be a function of intelligence
but of creativity.' While it is relatively easy to understand and
observe the connection between lack of food and malnutrition, it is
more difficult to perceive the relationship between a bushel of wheat
and a barrel of oil. Few understand food in the context of human
economics and the power of the free market to allocate more in terms
of money and less in terms of need. Fewer still see food as a resource
allocation of land and energy which is done consciously by government
planning or unconsciously through the free market economy.3 5
Consider for a moment the vast change in the state of knowledge
that our example child has realized over a twenty-five to thirty year
period. Thirty years ago some of these concepts would not have been
realized by even the most perceptive of individuals. Thirty years from
now much of what is presently in the forefront of knowledge will be
proven correct or merely the starting point for future insight. For if
the process of science is anything, it is change: seeking out the new,
discarding the outmoded, constantly looking for an ultimate, complete
view of the universe which may never be attained.
33. The Dutch appear to have been the first to combine the convex and concave
lenses in the late part of the 16th Century. Soon thereafter the instruments were
developed to resolve 1.4 microns at 270 magnification. In modern times the versatility of
the microscope has been greatly expanded by using electron beams (at a resolution of
100A0 a magnification of 50,000 is routine), x-rays, and ultrasound. T. RoCHOW & E.
Rocnow, AN INTRODUCTION TO MICROSCOPY BY MEANS OF LIGHT, ELECTRONS, X-RAYS OR
ULTRASOUND (1978).
34. See generally M. POLONYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 55-92 (1966); Greenberg, Eins-
tein: The Gourmet of Creativity, 115 ScI. NEWS 216 (1979).
35. For a discussion of this topic, see L. BROWN, THE TWENTY NINTH DAY 128-60
(1978).
1981
Duquesne Law Review
Take, for example, the fundamental issue of what are the elemental
building blocks of the physical world. The first clear articulation of an
atomic theory, before that term was created, was by Aristotle. While
reflecting many of the ideas of the Egyptians and Indians, he stated
that the physical world was composed of a mixture of four basic
elements: air, fire, earth, and water. Additionally, these elements could
be found in four states of being: hot, wet, dry, and cold. 8 This theory
represented an attempt by some of the most gifted intellects of Greece
to explain the basic structure of the physical universe. Artistotle's
theory was arrived at with little, if any, scientific experimentation as
we know it. As with the first steps of the child in the prior example,
he merely observed the world around him with his five senses, and
then tried to provide some rational explanation and categorization for
the phenomena which he observedY
Aristotle's conception of the basic elements passed on through the
centuries by the alchemists and pharmacists of medieval times. This
complete paradigm remained largely unchallenged until the latter half
of the 1700's. During this period a few researchers, using more
sophisticted apparatus, were experimenting with air and various gases.
There developed quickly a realization that air was not the same
everywhere: bottles of gases derived from different sources had dif-
ferent properties (sustain the breathing of a canary, support a flame,
have different weights, etc.). This provided the first crack in the
Aristotle paradigm.'
This step is analogous to the child gathering new information that
makes old series of categories seem inappropriate. The men of the
1700's were able to do this because the developments in primitive
technology allowed a great increase in the type of data gathered by
the human senses. 9 Note also that these men were among the first to
develop a scientific method for gathering data,0 and, thus, set the in-
tellectual stage for Lavoisier to make his scientific breakthrough which
would destroy the Artistotelian paradigm of matter.
36. Read, Chemistry, in WHAT IS SCIENCE? 154-55 (J. Newman ed. 1955) [hereinafter
cited as Read].
37. See WOODBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 65.
38. Read, supra note 36, at 157-65.
39. As Read states, modern chemistry owes its birth to the use of the balance and
other instruments of precision that allowed the chemist to observe chemical changes quan-
titatively. Id. at 164. For a discussion of how the development of technology is a critical
part of the advance of science, see Asimov, Pure and Impure: The Interplay of Science
and Technology, SAT. REV., June 9, 1979, at 23.
40. For a full enumeration of the elements of scientific method, see text accompanying
notes 56-57 infra,
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Now, as so often in the history of science, a point had been reached
at which the known facts enabled a tremedous step forward to be
taken. The only remaining obstacle was a mental one; for one of the
most difficult of all mental processes is to reassemble a series of
familiar facts and relationships and to regard them from a new view-
point.
In this ability lay the great genius of Lavoisier, who, without making a
single discovery of any new body, or property, or natural phenomenon,
demolished in the 1780s the barrier that had hitherto blocked progress
in chemistry.4
In his mind he rejected the previous paradigm and found that there
were elements more fundamental than air, water, and solid; that, in
fact, these new fundamental elements could be forced to go from one
physical state to another42 (ie., oxygen may be a pure gas, or combined
with hydrogen to form water or with other chemicals such as iron to
form solids). Thus, there arose a new paradigm around the concept of
atomic theory. According to this theory, atoms were the building
blocks of the universe. The atom was pictured as a "hard, im-
penetrable, movable particle .. . so very hard as never to wear or
break in pieces. . . .""I This picture corresponded with the best informa-
tion available at that time. However, science never stops inquiring and,
with more observation and better equipment, new ideas again come to
the forefront.
In 1898, J.J. Thomson discovered the particle known as the electron
and thus destroyed the picture of the impenetrable atom. Subsequently,
the atom was found to consist of three different particles: the electron,
proton, and neutron." Since the development of this model of the atom
there have been additional discoveries of particles but the search has
moved out of the realm of chemistry and into the world of high energy
physics. These developments in turn produced continued evolution and
refinements of the concepts contained within the atomic theory. If
science were not open ended and uncontrolled, the new ideas that
spurred further development would have been stifled. 5
41. Read, supra note 36, at 165.
42. Id at 166-68.
43. This was the view of Newton. Id. at 167.
44. Id. at 170-75.
45. A prime example of how outside control of science can stifle its growth is found
in the Lysenko affair in the Soviet Union. Lysenko, a self-educated agronomist who pro-
duced several ideas that helped the collective farms of the Soviet Union, had gained the
political support of Stalin around 1935. With this support came an attack by Lysenko on
Soviet geneticists. He believed that all characteristics were acquired by inheritance, and
that genes played no part in the development process. Lysenko believed that the heredity
characteristics of a living organism were determined by the external environmental condi-
1981
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The preceeding has been a non-scientist's introduction, not so much
to the substance of science, as the process of science. The process of
doing science is the focal point for the remainder of this article. It is
the process of science and scientific inquiry, as well as the substance of
science, with which society through the legal system must deal.
C. Science and the Law-Definition of Science
Before any meaningful legal analysis of the basis for a constitutional
right of scientific inquiry can be pursued, a workable legal definition of
scientific inquiry must be formulated. This definition would allow some
measure of predictability in the selection of activities to receive con-
stitutional protection- without the constant use of litigation to classify
each activity case by case."
While almost everyone may have a general sense of what science is,
such vague definition is not very helpful. Similarly, the previous defini-
tions suggested by scientists and philosophers of science cannot be used
since they are imprecise in their attempts to distinguish between pro-
tected and unprotected activities." For example, which of the following
activities are scientific inquiry: A group of college physics students at-
tempting to build an atomic bomb, the basement biologist trying to
tions of many generations and that each alteration of conditions led to a change in heredi-
ty. The culmination of the genetics controversy came in 1948 when Stalin banned research
and teaching in standard genetics and permitted Lysenko to mandate changes in school
curriculum and research programs.
Many reasons for the suppression have been given. For example, the genetics theorists
of his time were generally from the bourgeois families, and had been educated abroad.
Thus, it took only a little effort for the communist party to convert the geneticists'
disinterest in agriculture into a purposeful wrecking of the new economy, or their interest
in eugenics into sympathy with facist theories of racism. Others have stated that Stalin's
support for Lysenko arose from his desire to build a new Soviet man. It was theorized
that if the characteristics acquired in a man's lifetime can be inherited, then a unique
Soviet individual would emerge all the more quickly.
After 1948, in spite of constant attacks by modern geneticists, Lysenko maintained
his power through personal friendship with Stalin and, later, Khrushchev. With each attack,
Lysenko proposed other grandiose agricultural projects in order to boost his political
stock. It was not until 1964 with the fall of Khrushchev that Lysenko was finally
discredited and modern genetics was reborn in the Soviet Union. L. GRAHAM, SCIENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOVIET UNION 195-256 (1972); D. JORAVSKY, THE LYSENKO AFFAIR (1970);
Z. MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF T.D. LYSENKO (1969).
46. A failure to classify the conduct as protected could lead to hopeless confusion. A
classic example of this problem has occurred in obscenity cases. Without an adequate
definition of obscenity or pornography, the Supreme Court has been faced with an endless
procession of cases in which it has attempted to classify activities as protected or un-
protected under the first amendment on a piecemeal basis. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 656-70 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
47. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
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create life by randomly combining organic chemicals, the engineer who
must design an engine component for the NASA space shuttle, the pro-
fessor trying to determine the chemical reaction which takes place during
photosynthesis, the corporate scientist who works to understand the
fundamental process by which sunlight can be directly converted to
electrical energy, or the professor of sociology taking a random on-the-
street survey of views on marriage and divorce?
There are a number of possible approaches to legally defining a
term. One could break down the process of scientific inquiry into its
component parts; e.g., thinking, analyzing, observing, experimenting,
communicating, writing reports, publishing, receiving information, ad-
vocating positions, disseminating information, and collecting data. Each
component is analyzed independently'8 to determine whether it
deserves constitutaional protection. If the activity is made up solely of
traditional first amendment components, then a fortiori it is protected.
If traditional first amendment analysis shows the activity is composed
of both protected and unprotected parts, then the activity is entitled
to protection if a preponderance of the components are protected.'
9
The advantage of this approach is that the definition is framed in
terms of familiar concepts; e.g., thought, communication, etc. Addi-
tionally, its application in individual cases is relatively simple and
straightforward. There is a significant disadvantage, however, in
breaking scientific inquiry into component parts, because what results
48. This procedure has been adopted in formulating a legal definition of death. Life
can be broken down into many of its component activities; e.g., breathing, talking, thinking,
heartbeat, etc. Death is then defined in terms of the absence of one or more activities; for
example, unresponsiveness to normally painful stimuli, absense of spontaneous breathing,
a flat EKG; ie., absence of heart spontaneous brain functions. See Commonwealth v.
Golston, 373 Mass. 883, 336 N.E. 2d 744 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978)
49. Delgado and Millen employ this approach in their article which proposes a right
of scientific inquiry:
The precise components of a given scientific investigation will vary depending on
the discipline, the problem under study, and the researcher's choice of
methodology. In general, however, the process will include many of the following
elements: thinking, consulting with colleagues, experimentation, publishing results,
and teaching. The process is a continuous cycle; it can be interrupted by in-
terference with any of the component activities. New ideas and theories are often
sparked by experimentation or by discussion of the research results of colleagues.
The testing of one hypothesis may unexpectedly produce evidence suggesting a
completely different theory or casting doubt on an established principle. Because of
this interconnectedness, each stage of the process must be protected if the entire
enterprise is to be protected. Conversely, if each step in the process is protected,
the whole must be protected as well.
Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo, and Government. Toward Constitutional Protection For
Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349, 371 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Delgado & Millen]
(footnotes omitted).
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is a list of activities thay may encompass more than the "scientific in-
quiry" that was originally intended to be protected. For example, the
components thinking, analyzing, observing, etc., would also encompass
the activities of lawyers, economists, and historians."
This approach does not take cognizance of the uniqueness of scien-
tific inquiry or the complex problems associated with its regulation."
Frequently the focal point of governmental concern will be the ex-
perimental components of scientific inquiry. It is this step in the pro-
cess which is most difficult to incorporate into traditional categories of
analysis, but may nevertheless receive protection if a preponderence of
other components are protected. The ultimate effect of this approach is
to de-emphasize that component which should be the focus of the
analysis.
A better approach allows for the recognition of scientific inquiry as
a unique process and a spectrum spanning from purely theoretical
work to scientific experimentation. Because of the complex variety of
such situations, the development of a precise definition to help draw
the lines of distinction is difficult. 2 Nevertheless, the following test
should be sufficiently succinct to enable one to distinguish scientific in-
quiry from other activities. For an activity to fall within the definition
of "scientific inquiry" it must (1) have as its primary but not sole
motivation, the acquisition of knowledge which will lead to additional
understanding of the natural universe, allow new explanations of
natural phenomena, and result in the ability to make predictions con-
cerning the organic laws of the natural universe; and, (2) be carried out
in accordance with the accepted scientific method appropriate to the
nature of the activity.
The inquiry will be considered to be primarily motivated toward the
goal of the acquisition of knowledge if it is
50. This is not to suggest, however, that these activities should not be protected
under the first amendment; merely that they do not qualify as scientific inquiry.
51. Based on this approach, all the factual examples discussed in the text could be
classified as protected. All of those activities include thinking, analyzing, collecting data,
and observing. In addition, the college professor, the industrial researcher, and the NASA
engineer will, to a greater or lesser degree, engage in experimenting, communicating,
writing reports, and publishing and, therefore, would be protected under the component
approach.
52. Two prior articles that address the issue of the constitutional right of scientific
inquiry did not develop a workable definition. In passing, Robertson states that "research
is taken generally to encompass all activities and procedures designed to generate new
knowledge .... ." Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. Delgado
and Millen suggest that "'Basic research' has been defined as 'original investigations for
the advancement of scientific knowledge . . .which do not have specific [practical] objec-
tives or ends in view."' Delgado & Millen, supra note 49, at 352 n.21 (quoting NATIONAL
SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE INDICATORS 53 (1975)).
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(a) theoretical in nature, and involves the use of one's intellect and
communicative ability to develop existing theories, law, or
paradigms, or to formulate new theories, laws, or paradigms
concerning the natural universe;
(b) experimentation which seeks data to verify existing theories,
laws, or paradigms concerning the natural universe; or
(c) experimentation which seeks data from which new theories,
laws, or paradigms can be formulated concerning the natural
universe.
The term experimentation in the above definition is used in its
broadest sense. It is intended to include the passive observation of
naturally occurring phenomena as well as the collection of data obtained
under controlled conditions produced by human instigation.
The definition of scientific inquiry requires that the inquiry be
focused on the operation of the natural universe. Clearly included
within the scope of this term is the subject matter of the basic
disciplines chemistry, physics, biology, and astronomy,53 since they are
governed by laws which cannot be created by human intervention.
These "organic" laws exist independently of human discovery and
postulization, and are in theory the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry.
One the other hand, pursuits such as law, economics, and political
science would not be included in scientific inquiry since they concern
themselves with man's relationship with man rather than man's rela-
tionship with the natural universe. These disciplines are governed by
laws which can be created and changed by human intervention. Finally,
those disciplines referred to as the social sciences would be included to
the extent that they are concerned with organic rather than human
law.
It should be noted that not all experimentation is to be included
within the definition of scientific inquiry. Quite often experiments are
undertaken for purposes other than to verify existing theories, laws,
or paradigms; for example, educational experiments which seek to
demonstrate rather than verify, would not be included." Additionally,
53. Astronomy is the observation and accumulation of data concerning the history
and physical laws of the large bodies of the universe. Another major area of science is
physics which "concerns itself with matter and energy in all their general manifestations."
E. Condon, Physics, in WHAT IS SCIENCE 102 (J. Newman ed. 1955). Chemistry is concerned
with the properties of matter such as its structure, composition, and susceptibility to
change. Finally, there is the broad category of biology which may be considered as the
study, classification, and interaction of living organisms. See generally WHAT IS SCIENCE
(J. Newman ed. 1955).
54. The classic example is the dissecting of frogs in biology class. Killing frogs does
not result in any additional understanding of the natural universe. While a particular stu-
dent may gain personal knowledge, society has gained no additional information. This ac-
tivity therefore cannot be protected as scientific inquiry.
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testing procedures, although sometimes referred to as experiments,
would not be included. The purpose of testing is to acquire data which
can be used as a basis for decisions concerning the environment,
health, economics, or other areas of human interest. For example, a
series of chemical and biological tests on a particular stream to deter-
mine if the standards in the Federal Clean Water Act55 are being met
would not constitute scientific experiment-even though the tests
were carried out using scientific methodology.
Although an activity qualifies under the first part of the test, it may
still fall short of being classified as scientific inquiry unless it is car-
ried out in accordance with accepted scientific method.56 An activity
will be considered to employ the scientific method if it
(1) uses a suitable method for describing its subject matter; e.g.,
mathematics, words, diagrams, or symbols;
(2) uses an existing method systematizing or classifying the
material to be described, or creates a new method for doing so; e.g.,
classifying plants into species on the basis of particular features, or
naming and classifying sub-atomic particles;
(3) uses hypotheses for the purpose of predicting or accounting for
the occurrence of natural phenomena;
(4) uses experimentaton, as previously defined, to test hypotheses.
Experimentation should include (a) planning objectives and procedures,(b) potential for recognizing error and minimizing it by proper design,(c) gathering data and insuring its uniformity, (d) analyzing the data,
and interpreting the data and drawing conclusions based on the data. 7
55. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.).
56. It is important to understand the fundamental purpose of using the scientific
methodology. One author has suggested the following:
The real purpose of scientific method is to make sure Nature hasn't misled you
into thinking you know something you don't actually know. There's not a mechanic
or scientist or technician alive who hasn't suffered from that one so much that he's
not instinctively on guard. That's the main reason why so much scientific and
mechanical information sounds so dull and so cautious. If you get careless or go
romanticizing scientific information, giving it a flourish here and there, Nature will
soon make a complete fool out of you. It does it often enough anyway even when
you don't give it opportunities. One must be extremely careful and rigidly logical
when dealing with Nature: one logical slip and an entire scientific edifice comes
tumbling down. One false deduction about the machine and you can get hung up in-
definitely.
R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 101 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
PIRSIG].
57. See W. FOWLER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1962); E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 1-13 (1961); 5 MCGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 156 (1977); 12 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 102
(1977). The classic college science experiment has the student go through the following
steps: "(1) statement of the problem, (2) hypotheses as to the cause of the problem, (3) ex-
periments designed to test each hypothesis, (4) predicted results of the experiments,
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It should be recognized that the elements discussed need not co-exist
before an activity will be considered to employ the scientific method.
Theoretical work need only meet the first three requirements. Ex-
perimental work must satisfy the fourth as well.
Based upon the above two-part test for scientific inquiry, only the
chemistry professor and the corporate scientist would be engaged in
scientific inquiry. The college students attempting to build an atomic
bomb do not engage in scientific inquiry because their motivation is
not to gain an additional explanation, understanding, or prediction of
the natural universe. At the very best they are seeking to increase
their personal knowledge. Their work could not be considered an at-
tempt to verify an existing theory or law, since it is merely an effort
to reproduce present technology.
While the basement biologist seeking to create life by randomly
combining organic chemicals may have the goal of gaining an addi-
tional understanding of the natural universe, he is not carrying out his
work according to the scientific method. In particular, he has no
hypothesis on which to base his work. Furthermore, if his experimenta-
tion is unplanned or carried out using techniques which would not in-
sure uniformity and repeatability, it would not be considered to be using
the scientific method. This is not to say that all efforts of amateur
scientists are not scientific inquiry. It means only that their work must
meet the full test.
The space engineer who seeks to develop a new engine component
for the NASA space shuttle does not engage in scientific inquiry
because his primary goal is not to gain an additional understanding of
the natural universe, but to develop a technology which will meet a
particular design criteria. Although his work may in fact add to our
understanding of the natural universe, it would be insufficient to qualify
it for scientific inquiry.
The professor who works at his university laboratory to determine
the chemical reaction of photosynthesis does engage in scientific in-
quiry because his primary goal is to gain an understanding of a basic
process underlying the conversion of sunlight to plant energy. This
conclusion assumes that the professor employs the scientific method in
the conduct of his work.
The scientist who is employed by a private corporation to study the
fundamental process by which sunlight can be directly converted into
electrical energy would be engaging in scientific inquiry. This conclu-
sion presumes that the primary goal of the corporation in supporting
this work is to gain an additional understanding of the laws governing
(5) observed results of the experiments and (6) conclusions from the results of the experi-
ment." PIRSIG, supra note 56, at 100.
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the process of direct energy conversion in certain materials. The fact
that any useful knowledge developed from this work could lead to the
development of a profitable product or technology would not disqualify
the work from classification as scientific inquiry. 8 The overriding pur-
pose of any business entity is to create a profit for its investors. A
business entity, however, could sponsor some work so fundamental
that it cannot be said to relate directly to any product. The ultimate
test remains the same: if the primary goal is to gain knowledge which
will lead to an additional understanding of the universe, it is scientific
inquiry; if the prime motivation of the particular project is economic
gain, then it does not qualify as scientific inquiry.
Finally, the professor of sociology who conducts a survey on at-
titudes about marriage and divorce, perhaps to determine the cause of
the increase in divorce rates, would not be engaging in scientific in-
quiry. His study seeks to gain an understanding of the changing rela-
tionships between man-made laws and human conduct.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to give as precisely
as possible, a legal definition of scientific inquiry. Using this definition,
one can differentiate those activities which may claim constitutional
protection as scientific inquiry.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
If scientific inquiry is to be recognized as a constitutionally pro-
tected right, the government's ability to impose restrictions and
regulations will be severely limited. Faced with a constitutionally pro-
tected activity, the government has the burden of justifying any in-
terference. 9 Instead of requiring the scientist to overcome the
presumption that laws and regulations are valid, the government must
justify its intrusion under the appropriate constitutional test.
A constitutional right of scientific inquiry may be developed under
58. This fact is well accepted within the scientific society. As reflective of this at-
titude, scientists at Bell Telephone Laboratories have received seven Nobel Prizes for
research.
Clinton Davisson shared the Nobel Prize in 1937 for demonstrating the wave
nature of matter. In 1956, John Bardeen, Walter Brattain and William Shockley
were honored for their invention of the transistor. Philip Anderson's theoretical
work on amorphous materials (such as glass) and on magnetism led to a Nobel Prize
in 1977. And in 1978, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson received the Prize for detect-
ing the faint radiation from the "big bang" explosion that gave birth to the
universe some 18 billion years ago.
SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1979, at 5 (Bell Labs advertisement).
59. For example, if a regulation attempts to abridge speech directly, it will be found
unconstitutional unless the government shows that the message being suppressed poses a
"clear and present danger," constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or is otherwise un-
protected. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 582.
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either of two different approaches. The first finds its basis in the first
amendment right to free speech. 0 Under this approach a number of
possible lines of analysis can be pursued. Scientific inquiry can be
viewed as a single expressive activity; ie., speech, and thus entitled to
constitutional protection." Alternatively, one can recognize that cer-
tain activities carried out by the scientist are not communicative, but
nevertheless must be protected as a necessary incident to the full ex-
ercise of the communicative aspects of science. Finally, scientific in-
quiry could be categorized as "speech plus."
The second approach for the development of a right of scientific inquiry
offers a broader basis for establishment of constitutional protection.
Under this approach scientific inquiry, like the right of privacy or
travel, would be recognized as a fundamental right found either within
the structure of the Constitution or standing alone.2
A. Scientific Inquiry as Speech or as a Necessary Incident of Speech
1. Science as Pure Speech
It has been suggested that scientific research is protected as pure
speech under the first amendment.63 Scientific research is presumed to
be predominantly expressive and, therefore, entitled to be protected in
its entirety as speech. Many of the steps in the process make use of
written or verbal expression; e.g., consulting with colleagues,
publishing reports, teaching others in lectures, and interviewing the
subject of an experiment. Since a majority of the individual com-
ponents of scientific inquiry are communicative, it is argued, the pro-
cess in its entirety must be protected.
Other aspects of science are not directly involved with written or
verbal communication. For example, an experiment in high-energy
physics will involve months or even years of data gathering, computer
programming, and analyzing results. The actual communication of the
results of the work will occur over a short period of time and would
normally involve publishing a paper or giving an oral presentation.
Thus, while it is true that the normal communicative activities may
numerically outweigh these other activities, in fact, a much larger pro-
portion of a scientist's time is spent on activities other than speaking
or writing. Since these activities are not expressive in the normal
60. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... U.S. CONST., amend. I.
61. A hybrid of the above analysis has been suggested by Delgado. See Delgado and
Millen, supra note 49, at 371.
62. See notes 237-350 and accompanying text infra.
63. Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 14 AIZ. L.
REV. 893, 896-907 (1977).
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sense of the word, if they are to be protected, they would have to be
classified as symbolic speech.
In Spence v. Washington64 the Supreme Court suggested that two
important elements were necessary for symbolic speech. First, the
speaker must have an intention to convey a particular message and,
second, in the environment of the activity in question, the message
would be understood by those who were viewing it. 5
The weakness of considering scientific inquiry as pure speech
becomes apparent when the test of symbolic speech is applied to ex-
perimentation. If a subjective standard is employed, it is unlikely that
any communicative intent will be found. When the scientist conducts
an experiment, he intends to acquire data-unlike a demonstrator who
burns a draft card or displays a flag to communicate a concept or
idea." Additionally, the requirement of an intent to communicate will
not be satisfied when a particular researcher, by his own initiative or
by government regulation, decides to keep his research secret. In prac-
tice, a requirement of intent to communicate depending upon the ex-
perimenter's state of mind would result in some work being protected
and others not. Such a distinction would be entirely artificial and un-
workable in practice. Such a requirement could produce denial of con-
stitutional protection because a scientist about to carry out an experiment
is unlikely to perceive it as a communicative activity. On the other
hand, the requirement could be formally met by a simple one-sentence
declaration that all work was intended to be communicative.
It might be argued that an objective standard be used to determine
the communicative intent of the experimenter. In such a case, the sur-
rounding circumstances would be used to infer an intent to com-
municate. When burning a draft card or displaying a flag is carried out
before an audience, it is inferred that the person intends to com-
municate a message by his acts. However, experiments are rarely carried
out before an audience; moreover, from the scientists's viewpoint, it
would highly undesirable to do so, because of the need to control the
surrounding circumstances. Even assuming that the experimenter's in-
tent would be to communicate a message, it is highly unlikely that
anyone would receive his ideas or concepts from observing the activity.
7
64. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). In Spence the Court was called upon to deter-
mine the validity of a conviction based on a statute which made it a crime to publicly
display an American flag to which a peace symbol had been attached. The Court reversed
the conviction concluding that the petitioner's conduct was protected as symbolic speech
under the first amendment. Id at 415.
65. Id. at 410-11.
66. In Spence, displaying a flag with a peace symbol attached was alleged to be sym-
bolic speech. Id at 405. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the petitioner
claimed that burning his draft card was symbolic speech. Id. at 376.
67. PMSIG, supra note 56, at 103.
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The test developed in Spence was designed to deal with a single
event of relatively short duration which was intended to be expressive.
When this test is employed to evaluate experimentation, its applicability
becomes questionable. The process of experimentation rarely involves
a single event: much research is carried out over periods of months or
even years. Considering experimentation as symbolic speech is like
trying to place a triangular shape into a rectangular hole. Depending
on the size used it may occasionally be forced in, but in no event is the
result particularly satisfactory.
The pure speech approach requires that some aspects of scientific
inquiry such as experimentation be classified as symbolic speech.
While a logical argument can be made in support of such a position, it
requires extending present concepts well beyond the current bound-
aries established by the Court. It is unlikely that the Court would be
willing to so distort the symbolic speech concept.
Even if the problems of fitting experimentation within the confines
of symbolic speech are ignored, it is still very awkward and misleading
to classify the entity of scientific inquiry as pure speech. The primary
purpose of scientific inquiry is to advance the body of scientific
knowledge. 8 Although communication of ideas and data is important to
this goal and to the long term development of science, it is improper to
characterize the scientific process as basically expressive. Communica-
tion, either oral or written, is an important step in achieving the ends
of science, but it is only one step. Observation, data gathering, ex-
perimentation, analysis, and conclusions are equally important means
for achieving the ends of science-and such acts are not expressive as
normally defined.
2. Necessary Incident of Speech
Under a second line of analysis, those components of scientific in-
quiry which are not clearly speech may be protected, nevertheless, as
necessary incidents of speech. On a number of occasions the Supreme
Court has found it necessary to protect certain non-communicative ac-
tivities in order to insure the most effective exercise of the right of
free speech, 9 thereby fully implementing the strong policies underly-
68. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
69. The following is a summary of the "incident" cases as gathered by Professor
Tribe:
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (contributing money); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying flag with peace symbol attached); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing sign on back of jacket); Schacht v. United States, 398
U.S. 58 (1970) (wearing uniform); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing black armbands); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
(demonstration); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation); West Virginia
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ing the first amendment.7" In order to determine if a specific activity is
to be protected as a necessary incident, the Court must decide
whether the activity is essential to the meaningful exercise of the
right of free speech in light of the underlying policies. To ascertain
whether the non-communicative aspects of scientific inquiry are
necessary incidents, the policies underlying the first amendment will
be examined. Then specific activities will be evaluated to determine
their importance to the meaningful exercise of the communicative
aspects of scientific inquiry.
The policies and purposes of the first amendment have been variously
described as promoting individual self-fulfillment, societal interests,
and combinations thereof." The policy of self-fulfillment was first sug-
gested more than fifty years ago in Whitney v. California,72 when
Justice Brandeis stated, "Those who won our independence believed
that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties . . . . 7 The roots of this right of individual self-fulfillment go
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931) (displaying red flag).
TRIBE, supra note 46, at 599 n.11.
70. Concerning these policies the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), stated:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract
the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press in-
cludes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right
to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struther, 319 U.S. 141, 143) and freedom of
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 195) indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50, 261-63; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 112; Baggett v. Bullitt4 377 U.S. 360, 369. Without those peripheral rights the
specific rights would be less secure.
Id. at 482-83.
71. Professor Emerson has suggested that:
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression
may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance of a system of free expres-
sion is necessary (1) as a method of assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a
means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the
members of the society in social, including political, decision-making, and (4) as a
means of maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-5 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY]; see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 17-18 (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERN-
MENT (1948) [hereinafter cited as FREE SPEECH]; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960)
[hereinafter cited as POLITICAL FREEDOM]; TRIBE, supra note 46, at 576-79; Rehnquist, The
First Amendment- Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Rehnquist].
72. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
73. Id. at 375. This concept of individual self-fulfillment was recently referred to by
the Supreme Court in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972): "To permit the continued
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much deeper than the first amendment. They are based on two widely
accepted premises of Western thought: (1) that the proper end of man
is the fulfillment of his character and potential as a human being, and
(2) that an individual, as a member of society, is entitled to fair and
equal treatment from the state.
74
What standard is to be used to measure the development of man's
character and potential? It is man's extraordinary intellectual capacity
which differentiates him from the rest of the animal kingdom.75 This in-
tellectual capacity consists of a unique ability to observe and under-
stand the functioning of the environment and man's relationship to it.
Thus, in order for each individual to achieve fulfillment of his
character and potential as a human being, it is necessary to fully exer-
cise and develop these intellectual abilities. The process of developing
these abilities requires the acquisition of information from diverse
sources and the formulation of ideas and actions based on this informa-
tion.
This concept of self-fulfillment has been recognized in the United
States from the very beginning. In the Declaration of Independence it
is recognized that all men have certain inalienable rights including
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," rights which represent the
process by which one may obtain self-fulfillment.78 Further, the first
amendment was to be the guarantee that this pursuit of self-fulfillment
would not be interfered with by governmental action. If the first
amendment is perceived as the vehicle for carrying individuals to their
goal of self-fulfillment, then information and ideas are the fuel for the
vehicle. Without the right to acquire information or to formulate ideas,
the right to speak would be meaningless.
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our
people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censor-
ship." Id. at 95-96.
74. See TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 71, at 4-5.
75. See ORIGINS, supra note 27, at 179-205; C. SAGAN, THE DRAGONS OF EDEN 22-79
(1977).
76. To Thomas Jefferson self-fulfillment was one of the basic drives of man. Gary
Wills observed:
Within its original rich context, the pursuit of happiness is a phenomenon both
obvious and paradoxical. It supplies us with the ground of human right and the goal
of human virtue. It is the basic drive of the self, and the only means given for
transcending the self. As Hutchenson put it: "The several rights of mankind are
therefore first made known by the natural feelings of their hearts, and their
natural desires pursuing such things as tend to the good of each individual or those
dependent on him; and recommending to all certain virtuous offices." Men in the
eighteenth century felt they could become conscious of their freedom only by
discovering how they were bound: When they found what they must pursue, they
knew they had a right to pursue it.
G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 247 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WILLS].
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Another aspect of self-fulfillment focuses on the relationship be-
tween an individual and his government. The right of an individual to
receive fair treatment from the state can likewise be assured only if he
can communicate his needs to the government and can participate in
the decisions made by the state. An individual must be free to voice
dissatisfaction with acts of the state, to petition for benefits, or to give
one's point of view to those who govern.
The second basic interest promoted by the first amendment focuses
on the benefits of free expression to society." This approach, labeled
"utilitarian,"78 has sometimes been narrowly viewed as extending only
to the discussion of public or political issues which are essential to in-
telligent self-government in a democratic system." More recently it
has been argued that societal interests are broader and that the first
amendment was meant to promote discussions of philosophical, social,
artistic, economic, or ethical matters."'
77. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957), stated:
For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into
these problems, speculations about them, stimulations in others of reflections upon
them must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from in-
trusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government
and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously com-
pelling.
"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge."
Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA
10-12). In Sweezy a teacher's refusal to answer questions about his lectures at the Univer-
sity of New Hampshire and his knowledge of the Progressive Party led to his conviction
under the state's Subversive Activities Act. The Supreme Court overturned the convic-
tion. Id. at 255.
78. Justice Rehnquist describes the utilitarian approach as follows:
The . . . "utilitarian" justification, sees this right of the citizen as a means to the
end of achieving certain social purposes. Whether cast in terms of the need for an
informed electorate, or the desirability of a'free flow of ideas for non-political
reasons as well, the citizen's right to speak out exists not so much because it
benefits him but because it benefits society....
[This view], treats as the highest end of society the maintenance of an informed
electorate.... As Alexander Meiklejohn, the primary exponent of this viewpoint in
modern times, has said: "Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters ac-
quire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."
Rehnquist, supra note 71, at 3-4 (quoting Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Ab-
solute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (emphasis in original). See also FREE SPEECH, note 71
supra; POLITICAL FREEDOM, note 71 supra.
79. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 577.
80. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). See TRIBE, supra note 46,
at 577.
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As is the case with individual self-fulfillment, society's interests in
an informed citizenry8 1 cannot be adequately protected unless the
rights incident to speech are also recognized. While it is true that the
first amendment expressly refers to speech, it is also apparent that
certain non-communicative activities are of equal importance in carry-
ing out first amendment policies. The Supreme Court has recognized
this fact on numerous occasions and has given protection to these cor-
ollary activities.2
Underlying both the interest of the individual and the interest of
society is a fundamental premise that individuals and government will
make the best decisions only when they have the most reliable infor-
mation available. The first amendment acts as the mechanism for
fulfillment of individual and societal interests, since it assures a pro-
cess to determine the truth of a particular matter." It has long been
recognized that the best way to insure that individuals and societies
arrive at the truth is through the free exchange of ideas in the
marketplace. 4 Even before the first amendment was drafted, the need
for a free exchange of ideas was understood. More than 300 years ago,
81. This broad social interest was recognized in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), in which the Court stated, "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about the political and social
changes desired by the people." Id at 484.
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), a statute that held a pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct if he engaged in
price advertising was attacked as a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Court recognized that a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information
could be keener than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. Id at 763-64.
"Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial in-
formation." Id. at 764.
The Supreme Court in striking down a Massachusetts law that prohibited corporations
from spending funds to influence referenda elections, recognized the public's right to
receive information from corporations. The Court noted that "the people in our democracy
are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
82. See note 69 supra.
83. As Justice Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), "They
[the founding fathers] believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth .... " Id. at
375.
84. Professor Emerson suggests that:
It is essential to note that the theory [of free speech] contemplates more than a
process for arriving at an individual judgment. It asserts that the process is also
the best method for reaching a general or social judgment. Through the acquisition
of new knowledge, the toleration of new ideas, the testing of opinion in open com-
petition, the discipline of rethinking its assumptions, a society will be better able to
reach common decisions that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members.
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY, supra note 71, at 8.
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the English Parliament enacted a statute which provided that no books
could be printed or sold without first obtaining a license. John Milton,
in attacking the statute stated, "Truth and understanding are not such
wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and
standards."85
Justice Holmes, in one of his famous dissents, laid the groundwork
for incorporating a marketplace of ideas into the first amendment:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition.... But when men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 6
This concept of the marketplace of ideas subsequently has been ac-
cepted by the majority of the Supreme Court in several opinions."
From these cases there can be gleaned three activities which are
necessary for the effective functioning of the marketplace: (1) the ac-
quisition of information; (2) the development of ideas or concepts; and
(3) the communication of ideas.8
85. Milton, Areopagitica, in POLITICAL AND CivIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (N.
Dorsen, P. Bender & B. Neuborn ed. 1976).
86. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
87. For example in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court
stated:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and ex-
periences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC.
Id. at 390.
In a case dealing with a state law requiring the signing of loyalty oaths by college pro-
fessors, the Court stated, "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection.'" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). See also Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 250.
88. It could be argued that science was the first institution to make use of the con-
cept of the marketplace and that the framers of the Constitution were well aware of its
value as a truth-seeking mechanism. In fact, during the 18th Century this concept was
adopted by the developing social and political institutions of the time. See text accompany-
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In a variety of fact situations, the Supreme Court has recognized a
right to acquire information. The Court has upheld such a right in con-
nection with the door-to-door distribution of religious material,89 the
receipt of sexually explicit material," the receipt of political propaganda
from abroad,9' and receipt by consumers of information about prescrip-
tion prices92 and availability of real property23 In all of these decisions,
the Court analyzed the policy underlying the first amendment and con-
cluded that these activities must be protected as necessary incidents
to speech.
The second necessary element of the marketplace is the develop-
ment of ideas or concepts. In the United States most people take the
right to think for granted. History is replete with tales of attempts to
control what men believe and think," however, and even the United
States, long considered a free country, is not without examples of in-
ing notes 254-63 infra. See also ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE. supra note 21, at 121-37; WILLS,
supra note 76, at 93-164.
89. In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the Court struck down an or-
dinance which banned door-to-door distribution of literature as applied to a Jehovah's
Witness who sought to advertise a religious meeting. The Court held that the ordinance
infringed on the rights of individual householders to decide whether or not to receive in-
formation as well as the right of the distributor to disseminate such information. The
"right to receive" was "necessarily" protected by the first amendment since its purpose
was to promote enlightenment over ignorance. Id at 143.
90. In reversing a criminal conviction for knowingly having possession of obscene
matter, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), focused on the issue of ob-
taining the material in question. "It is now well established that the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and Press] . . .
necessarily protects the right to receive .... ' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143.... This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), is fundamental to our free society." Id at
564.
91. In Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court held that a post office
regulation which required that addressees of Communist political propaganda from abroad
affirmatively request its delivery violated the first amendment. In a concurring opinion
Justice Brennan stated: "I think the right to receive publications is . .. a fundamental
right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that
had only sellers and no buyers." Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
93. In Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Supreme
Court struck down a township ordinance that prohibited the posting of for sale or sold
signs on real estate. The Court's holding was based at least in part on the recognition of
the right of the would be purchasers to receive information concerning the availability of
real property. Id. at 92.
94. Galileo encountered similar difficulties with his beliefs. See note 1 supra. Lysenko
with the aid of Stalin attempted such control in Russia. See note 45 supra.
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tolerance for the beliefs and thoughts of others.'5 While it appears en-
croachment by the government upon one's thoughts or beliefs is a
remote possibility, the potential for such action nevertheless exists.
Over fifty years before the drafting of the first amendment the
necessity of free thought was acknowledged by Mrs. Silence Dogood,
also known as Benjamin Franklin:
Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom, and
no such thing as publick [sic] liberty, without freedom of speech; which
is the right of every man, as far as by it, he does not hurt or controul
[sic] the right of another; and this is the only check it aught to suffer,
and the only bounds it aught to know."
Franklin's beliefs are at the core of the first amendment and have
been reiterated by the Supreme Court. In Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education the Court observed, "For at the heart of the First Amend-
ment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he
will and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."9
Ideas, which are the product of the human mind, are the goods of
the marketplace. Without ideas there could be no marketplace.
Moreover, if the marketplace is to fulfill its function of truth seeking,
all ideas must be available for consideration.
The final element of the marketplace is the communication of ideas.
The focus of concern here is with the channels of communication and
not the content. Any interference with these channels of communica-
tion will restrict the number of ideas available to the marketplace. In
keeping open the channels of communication the Supreme Court has
found it necessary to give constitutional protection to activities that
are not speech.
A prime example in which the Court sought to keep the channels of
communication open is Buckley v. Valeo9 In this case the key provi-
sions of the Federal Election Campaign Act 9 were challenged as
abridging the first amendment freedom of speech. Of particular con-
cern was the provision which set a $1000 limit for expenditures by in-
dividuals and groups relative to a clearly identified candidate. The
Court discussed the power of the federal government to control the ex-
95. Rice, The High Cost of Thinking the Unthinkable, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1973,
at 89 [hereinafter cited as Rice]; see note 142 infra. Textbook censorship is a growing
phenomenon. Citizen committees have forced local school boards to ban such work as
Shakespeare's plays and Webster's International Dictionary. Detroit News, Mar. 14, 1980,
at 1A, col. 6.
96. I. COHEN. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HIS CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN TRADITION (1953).
97. 431 U.S. at 234-35.
98. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
99. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat.
1263 (amended 1976).
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penditure of money in the political process and specifically recognized
that while the expenditure of money was not, per se, a communicative
act, it was so closely intertwined with expression, that any abridgment
of the expediture process would be an abridgment of speech.1 Even
though the regulation did not focus on ideas expressed by an in-
dividual, it directly imposed quantity restrictions on the political com-
municative process, by placing a $1000 expenditure ceiling for any in-
dividual relative to any particular candidate.10' Implicit in the Court's
discussion is the proposition that any significant limitation on quantity
must ultimately lead to a reduction of the quality of the speech. Such a
limitation would severely limit the number of ideas available in the
marketplace to further the truth-seeking process. The Supreme Court
has recognized that certain activities are by nature an integral part of
the communicative process and, therefore, protected by the first
amendment."2
In light of the above discussion, it is now appropriate to focus on
scientific inquiry. As previously stated, many of the activities of scien-
tific inquiry are communicative. In order to insure that there is a
meaningful exercise of this right, it will be shown that it is necessary
to protect all the non-communicative aspects of scientific inquiry. It is
only in this way that goals of individual and societal development, in-
cluding truth seeking, can be fully realized.
Scientific inquiry can be broken down into component parts to
facilitate identifying the communicative and non-communicative com-
ponents. Non-communicative components will further be examined to
determine whether or not each is essential to the communicative com-
ponents and, thus, are necessary incidents of speech. The four essential
components of scientific inquiry are: observation, formulation of
hypothesis, experimentation, and communication. 3 It should be
recognized that in most cases the dividing line between these com-
ponents is not distinct, thereby resulting in overlap, feedback, and
discontinuity. These elements will be discussed in order descending
from the most to least communicative, rather than following the normal
progression of the process of scientific inquiry.
a. Communication
The advancement of science has always been heavily dependent
upon written and oral expression. Over the centuries, communication
100. 424 U.S. at 16-17.
101. Id at 17-22.
102. See note 69 supra.
103. This breakdown follows the steps in the scientific method previously discussed.
See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
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among scientists and the free exchange and discussion of ideas has
been the mechanism used to insure the reliability of scientific informa-
tion. Free dissemination of information through a marketplace
mechanism has been a tradition with scientists, and the source of its
unique capability for self-correction. T' Since the Court is willing to give
general recognition to the value of the marketplace, it certainly should
do so in the context of scientific inquiry.
Written expression is equally important because of the cumulative
aspect of science. The barriers of time, distance, and death require the
availability of written information. Each scientist, is making his con-
tribution, relies on the work of those that have preceded him.0 '
Without the basic research which produced the discovery of the double
helix structure of the DNA molecule, for instance, research on recombi-
nant DNA would not be possible.' 8
Scientific communication may arise in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances. For example, oral expression may involve the presentation
of a paper at a scientific society meeting, panel discussions, private
conversation in person or by telephone, or testimony before a congres-
sional committee. Written expression may consist of letters, reports,
and publications in scientific journals. All of these examples of the
communicative component of scientific inquiry should be considered
speech protected under the explicit language of the first amendment.
b. Observation
One of the methods by which scientists acquire information is obser-
vation. Scientific observation entails passive data gathering; that is the
act of recognizing and noting natural occurrences. It is carried out
directly by viewing natural phenomena or indirectly by receiving infor-
mation from others. Observation is often the beginning point of scien-
tific inquiry. One of the most famous examples of the observation of a
natural phenomenon triggering the scientific process is Isaac Newton's
observation of the apple falling to the ground, ' 7 which led to Newton's
articulation of the laws of gravitation.
104. ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 21, at 122.
105. Newton was modest about his achievements. He once said that if he had seen fur-
ther than others "it was by standing upon the shoulders of giants." F. RUTHERFORD, G.
HOLTON & F. WATSON, PROJECT PHYSICS 112 (1975).
106. An example of this building process can be found in an article relating the most
recent advances in the attempt to understand how the DNA code begins the process of
cell division. In discussing their work the authors acknowledge the contributions of seven
other scientists who prior work allowed them to proceed along the path of scientific in-
quiry. De Robertis & Gurdon, Gene Transplantation and the Analysis of Developmen
SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1979, at 74-82.
107. W. DURANT, THE AGE OF LouIs XIV 536-43 (1963)
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Observation is just as essential to the scientific process today. The
observation of such phenomena as black holes,' 8 lung arteries,' 9 the
surface of the planet Venus,"' and volcanoes of Jupiter's moon,
however, can only be made with sophisticated instruments. In the
above examples, the information gathered was a necessary precondi-
tion to the advancement of science. But until the technological means
of acquiring the information was available, the respective areas of
science and scientific communications could not go forward. Govern-
mental interference with the acquisition of information would similarily
frustrate the underlying policies of the first amendment. Limiting
observation would prevent the individual scientist from reaching his
goal of self-fulfillment, since it would hinder his primary goal of seek-
ing knowledge of the universe,"2 and would hamper his professional
development within the institution of science."'
From society's perspective, interference with the acquisition of in-
formation will impair the truth-seeking function of the marketplace.
Normally, once the data is received into the scientific community, it is
thoroughly analyzed and discussed. The data is interpreted, laws are
formulated, and further theories are postulated. Data obtained from
observation is the fuel for the scientific process. Without new data, ex-
pansion of the body of scientific knowledge would stop. Ultimately the
marketplace would become devoid of new ideas and the policy of the
first amendment would be defeated.
c. Formulation of Hypotheses and Drawing of Conclusions
The formulation of an hypothesis and the drawing of conclusions are
basically mental processes. This component would include all
theoretical work. If any activity would be classified as a necessary
precondition to the meaningful exercise of the expression, it must be
an ability to think as one chooses.' The right to think, pursue, and
108. A Super-massive Object in Galaxy M87, 113 Sci. NEWS 308 (1978).
109. Unzipping Blood Vessel Linings, 113 Sci. NEWS 346 (1978).
110. Probes Bound for Venus Atmosphere, 114 Sci.NEws 100 (1978).
111. Voyager 1: Active lo, Jolting Jupiter, 115 Sci. NEWS 165 (1979).
112. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
113. One of the key methods of advancement within the scientific community is by
publishing the results of experimentation. H. MENARD, SCIENCE: GROWTH AND CHANGE
84-128 (1971).
114. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this activity to the scien-
tific process:
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the
laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and
speculation. . . . For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of
society-inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in
others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 261.
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develop one's ideas is essential to the scientist because it is the
essence of science to pursue knowledge, to question and investigate
any subject, and to hold and state whatever conclusions naturally flow
from such investigation.1 1 5
Like observation, the development of ideas or concepts is essential
to the communicative activities of science because the marketplace
could not function without the benefit of intellectual reflection. Infor-
mation gathered from observation could not be fully utilized without
proper interpretation. From this interpretation flow the various laws
and paradigms which are the goals of scientific inquiry.
d. Experimentation
The formulation of a hypothesis will in the normal course of scien-
tific inquiry lead to the development of experiments to prove or
disprove the hypothesis. For the purpose of this analysis, experimenta-
tion refers to the active collection of data obtained from controlled con-
ditions produced by human instigation."6 Unlike observation, which
consists of passively receiving information, experimentation involves
the creation of artificial, controlled conditions under which data can be
obtained, experimentation is of special concern because it may involve
the creation of risks to scientists, other humans, their property, and
the natural environment.'
The gathering of information is not unique to science. News gather-
ing is an important prerequisite for the effective exercise of freedom
of the press. In the case of reporters, the Court has recognized that ac-
tive news gathering may be protected as a necessary incident to the
right of freedom of the press."8 A parallel argument can be made that
since experimentation is the active information-gathering step in the
process of scientific inquiry it must be protected as a necessary inci-
dent of the communicative components of scientific inquiry.119
Experimentation is an essential step in the scientific process'20
115. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
117. See, e.g., note 221 infra.
118. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972): "[We do not suggest] that news gather-
ing does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated .... [R]eporters remain free to
seek news from any source by any means within the law:' Id. at 681-82. See Delgado &
Millen, supra note 49, at 375-76.
119. This argument is more fully developed by other commentators. See Delgado &
Millen, supra note 49, at 371-81; Robertson, supra note 52, at 1226-40.
120. While the Supreme Court has not yet expressly recognized a constitutional right
to experiment, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged the importance of experimentation in
the scientific process. "Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of
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because it is the component employed to acquire the data necessary to
validate a hypothesis. Without experimentation the truth-seeking func-
tion of science would be severely hampered.'2' As was the case with
observation, without experimental data there would be nothing to com-
municate and the policies underlying the first amendment would
likewise be frustrated.
3. Speech Plus
On several occasions the Supreme Court has characterized activities
as "speech plus." For example, in the areas of public demonstration
and picketing, the Court has held that if there is both speech and con-
duct, the activity may receive a lesser degree of protection than is af-
forded pure speech." This approach has been criticized by the text
writers as an artificial distinction which creates more problems than it
solves."
Even if the analytical shortcomings of the speech plus approach are
ignored, the approach still would not be applicable to scientific inquiry.
The speech plus analysis deals with physical activities which are
associated with a particular method of communication and which usually
occur simultaneously with the communication. The activities of obser-
vation and experimentation do not occur simultaneously with com-
munication but are a necessary precondition to effective communica-
observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge. A sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which,
equally with scientific research, is the concern of the university." Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN
SOUTH AFRICA 10-12).
See also Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), in which the Court stated: "[I]n the
science of medicine, as in other sciences, experimentation is the spur of progress. It would
amount to condemnation of new ideas without a trial to give the . . . power to condemn
new ideas as fraudulent solely because some cling to traditional opinions with unquestion-
ing tenacity." Id at 274.
121. During the infancy of science the Greeks made no clear delineation between
science and philosophy. Science was based mostly upon observation and reflection. Ex-
perimentation was not a part of early science. See STEARNS, supra note 26, at 8; WooD-
BRIDGE, note 26 supra. See also note 28 supra.
122. In Buckley the Supreme Court made the following observation:
[I]n Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court contrasted picketing and
parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a public official.
The parading and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct "intertwined
with expression and association," whereas the newpaper comment and the telegram
were described as a "pure form of expression" involving "free speech alone" rather
than "expression mixed with particular conduct."
424 U.S. at 17 (quoting 379 U.S. at 563-64).
123. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 598-601.
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tion.12' Additionally, these activities are not associated with any par-
ticular method of communication which might be used by the scientist.
Thus, it is more appropriate to consider the physical activities involved
in scientific inquiry as a necessary incident rather than "speech plus".
4. Constitutional Standards of Review Under the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has never developed a comprehensive set of
tests to determine the validity of a governmental action which
abridges speech.' During the past few decades the spectrum of at-
titudes of the various Justices on the Court has ranged from a view
that the right of expression is absolute,12 to one that the right can be
infringed upon a showing of a clear and present danger,'12 7 to one allow-
ing abridgment if government interest outweighs the value of the com-
munication.12 8
An examination of the cases indicates that the test to be applied in
a particular situation depends first upon whether governmental regula-
tion is directed at speech; i.e., is content neutral. 29 If the regulation is
aimed directly at the expression or the communicative impact of the
activity, the abridgment will be unconstitutional unless the govern-
ment demonstrates that the speech or ideas represent a "clear and
present danger,"1 0 are defamatory 3' or obscene,'3 2 or come within one
124. The Supreme Court found the payment of money in the political context did not
constitute any "plus" conduct stating, "Yet this Court has never suggested that the
dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16. Observation and experimentation, like the payment of
money, are the preconditions to speech and necessary incidents that must be protected.
125. POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-59 (N. Dorsen, P. Bender &
B. Neuborne eds. 1976); see generally TRIBE, supra note 46, at 580-601.
126. In Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134-62 (1959) and Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-80 (1961), Justices Black and Douglas in their dissents expressed
the view that first amendment rights are absolute; see also Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First
Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428 (1967).
127. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Torke, Some Notes on the Pro-
per Uses of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1.
128. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972).
129. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 580.
130. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
132. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Vol. 19:651
Scientific Inquiry
of the other narrow categorical exceptions;' or that the governmental
impingement is necessary to further a compelling state interest." If
the regulation advances a substantial governmental interest, other
than controlling the ideas or information generated by scientific inquiry,
then an incidental abridgment will be permitted if its restriction is no
greater than required to the furtherance of the governmental
interest.1
35
a. Restraints Directed at Expression
(i) Protection from Imminent Lawless Action
It has long been recognized that the state has a compelling interest
in protecting its citizens from the dangers of imminent lawless action.
Any state regulation that seeks to protect this interest must satisfy
the requirements of what has become known as the clear and present
danger test. The clear and present danger test was first articulated in
Schenck v. United States,"' and refined in a series of cases culminating
in Whitney v. California"' in which Justice Brandeis stated:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression."'
Subsequently, in Dennis v. United States,"' the Court, while referring
to Whitney, retreated from the strictness of the test. Finally in
Brandenburg v. Ohio"' the Court restricted the tests of the prior
cases, stating that a state may not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action."''
133. For example, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens against
false advertising. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
134. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
135. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381.
136. 249 U.S. at 52.
137. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
138. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
139. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
140. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
141. Id at 447.
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In order to qualify for analysis under the clear and present danger
test, a case must, in the first instance present the possibility that the
speech would lead to imminent violence or other lawless actions. In the
area of scientific inquiry this situation could arise when a scientist
presents the results of his research to a hostile audience, but it would
be rare, since most scientific presentations would not generate anger
or hostility of such a dangerous degree.
Consider the situation where a geneticist presents a speech based
on his own research from which he has concluded that because of dif-
ferent genetic development a particular race has a lower average in-
telligence level than other races."' The presentation of a speech on
that subject could give rise to two different motivations for a govern-
mental prohibition of the presentation. First, the information contained
in the speech could have severe social, economic, and political conse-
quences. Such information would disrupt present governmental pro-
grams aimed at achieving racial equality."' The speech could also
result in psychological trauma to individual members of that race. In
spite of these adverse consequences, the clear and present danger test
as currently articulated would not justify governmental intrustion. The
"incidence of the evil apprehended" is not so imminent that there is no
opportunity for full discussion.' Whether the views of the scientist
are true or false plays no part in justifying government prohibition
under this theory. If the scientist's conclusions are true, the test pro-
vides no justification for prohibition. If the theory is false there would
be "time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the process of education .... 11115
The second reason for government intervention would arise not so
much from the content of the speech, but because of the immediate
circumstances surrounding his presentation and the potential for
violence. Under the Brandenburg test two circumstances must be con-
sidered: the state of mind of the speaker and the potential for adverse
audience reaction. If our scientist merely intends to convey the results
142. In 1969, Arthur R. Jensen published an article entitled How Much Can We Boost
LQ. and Scholastic Achievement? in which he presented evidence that blacks, as a group,
score lower on I.Q. tests than whites. Based on his study, Jensen suggested that heredity
may have more effect than environment in determining intelligence and concluded that pro-
grams of environmental enrichment were doomed to failure. 39 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969).
Shortly thereafter, William Schockley, a Stanford physicist and Nobel laureate, concluded
that blacks were genetically inferior and proposed to teach a course at Stanford based on
his views. Rice, supra note 95, at 89.
143. The presentation also could have political consequences since such scientific
evidence contradicts one of the fundamental premises underlying our whole politicial
system, namely that "all men are created equal."
144. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377.
145. Id.
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of his work to an audience, ie., any group of listeners, he could not be
prohibited from speaking. On the other hand, if he intended to incite
imminent lawless action by his audience, then the first part of the test
would be satisfied.1 4
Presuming the first element of the test is satisfied, it is also
necessary that the audience, given the surrounding circumstances, is
likely to respond to the speech in such a way as to produce the lawless
action.147 Some of the factors which might be significant in applying
test are: size of audience, racial mix, location of speech, prior events,
and weather conditions. For example, a speech given to a group of
fellow scientists at an annual meeting in a resort area seems much less
likely to produce imminent violence as a presentation to a gathering of
members of the race in question on their home grounds.1 8
Because of the nature of the clear and present danger test, it would
never be appropriate to use it in evaluating governmental regulation
which seeks to prohibit observing, hypothesizing, or experimenting.
Since the vast majority of scientific work is done in private, it is
seldom communicated to the public at large or in a posture of ad-
vocacy. Finally, with the limitations of the clear and present danger
test it is most likely that the state will seek to justify any direct infringe-
ment on the basis of some other compelling interest.
(ii) Other Compelling State Interests
In addition to protecting citizens from the dangers of imminent
lawless action, the state is permitted to abridge expression directly
when advancing a compelling interest.49 These compelling interests
arise in a limited number of circumstances wherein the state seeks to
protect itself or its citizens from harm caused by the communication of
ideas or opinions." In determining whether there is, in fact, a compel-
146. 395 U.S. at 447.
147. An address either to members of the "inferior race" for the purpose of inciting
them to riot and thus demonstrating their intellectual inferiority or an address to
members of a "superior race" for the purpose of inciting them to commit violence upon
the inferior race would satisfy the test.
148. In May of 1973, Hans J. Eysench, a British psychologist, gave a lecture at the
'London School of Economics on race and intelligence based on views similar to Jensen's.
As he began his speech, he was attacked by students who cut his nose, pulled his hair,
and broke his glasses. In Jensen's case, demonstrators invaded his classes at the University
of California and Berkeley and disrupted his lectures with heckling and bomb threats.
Rice, supra note 95, at 89, 92.
149. See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 580-84.
150. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Chief Justice Hughes gave the follow-
ing illustrations of exceptional cases involving direct infringement and justifying prior
restraint: (1) restraints during wartime to prevent the disclosure of military deployments
1981
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ling interest which would justify a prior restraint, the Court has shown
a willingness to go beyond a broad assertion by the state that a com-
pelling interest exists and to determine the existence of the interest
for itself."' For example, in the area of national security, the Court has
held that the mere assertion of some general danger to national security
is not sufficient to justify a prior restraint of speech. The Court has re-
quired the government to show that disclosure "must inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperilling the safety of a transport already at sea . . . ."I" There are
two requirements necessary to justify a prior restraint: (1) the injury
must be certain to occur and (2) the harm must be irreparable."' A for-
tiori it must be a situation in which more speech will not be an alter-
native remedy.
Applying these concepts to scientific inquiry, the government may
seek to justify a prior restraint to protect itself or its citizens from immi-
nent, irreparable harm."" This harm might arise because the knowl-
edge gained from scientific inquiry is considered dangerous in and of
itself, or the knowledge gained from scientific inquiry, if misused or
abused, could lead to harm or injury.
In seeking to protect itself, the government may invoke national
security as a justification for restrictions on scientific inquiry. In most
cases the prohibition would be directed at the disclosure of information
gained from scientific work."' For example, the government may
or obstruction of the military effort, (2) enforcement of obscenity laws, and (3) enforce-
ment of laws against incitement to acts of violence or revolution. Id. at 716.
The Court also upheld a direct infringement involving a subsequent restraint involving
client solicitation by attorneys. The Court recognized the state's compelling interest "in
preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching and other, 'vexatious conduct."' Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 462 (1978).
151. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
152. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716).
153. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
154. The state also could abridge scientific inquiry through a subsequent restraint.
For example, it could impose civil or criminal penalties for publishing false data. Such
situations would probably be dealt with in the same way as defamatory statements. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
155. In the fall of 1979, the government sought to enjoin the publication of a magazine
containing an article which showed a cross section of a hydrogen bomb and a comprehen-
sive description of radiation coupling, along with two other concepts not found in the
public realm. The government claimed that this information was "born classified" and
disclosure would harm national security. The district court issued a preliminary injunction
finding that "publication or other disclosure of the Secret Restricted Data contained in
the Morland article would irreparably harm the national security of the United States."
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed mem., 610 F.
2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The Justice Department subsequently abandoned its efforts when
the information was published elsewhere. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
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assert a compelling interest in preventing the disclosure of information
gained from research on nuclear weapons, new concepts for tracking
missiles or satellites, and intelligence-gathering techniques involving
satellites. It is also possible, however, for the restriction to be directed
at the other steps in the scientific process. The government might
achieve the same result by prohibiting the experimentation necessary
to generate the knowledge.
A prior restraint on scientific inquiry would be justified if the state
could show that an injury was certain to occur and the harm caused
would be irreparable. In the case of national security the government
would assert that if information generated by scientific inquiry is ob-
tained by a hostile foreign power it would be dangerous in and of itself
since it could affect treaty negotiations or, alternatively, that the infor-
mation would upset the international balance of power. It could also be
argued that certain information is dangerous because it could be used
to develop technologies militarily advantageous to our enemies. ' "
Assuming that the government sustains its burden of establishing
that these injuries are certain to occur, it must also establish that
more speech or post-publication punishment will not be a suitable
remedy. Once the scientific information goes beyond the borders of
this country, control of its application escapes the jurisdiction of the
United States government. Therefore, the only practical stage at
which control may be exerted is at the scientific level. In this situation,
more speech within the United States cannot prevent the harm. The
potential abuse or misuse of scientific information by foreign powers,
gives rise to a compelling state interest justifying a state interference
with science.""
In addition to protecting itself, the state may occasionally seek to
protect its citizens from harm caused by ideas or information. In cer-
tain situations the state may claim that information gained from scien-
tific inquiry can, in and of itself, cause harm when communicated to
the public. The state of Arkansas sought to protect the mental and
156. That the knowledge obtained from scientific inquiry might be abused or misused
by the development of harmful technologies is not normally a sufficient justification for a
prohibition of inquiry, because, as a less restrictive alternative, the governmental interest
can be asserted at the development or the marketing stage to prevent harm. The first
amendment policy of having a free exchange of ideas which can be tested in the
marketplace would outweigh any governmental interest that seeks to protect its citizens
by keeping them in a state of ignorance.
157. In these cases, there remains a serious problem with overly broad security
orders. Security orders, unlike other administrative regulations, are not subject to the
normal open procedures which include notice, hearings, standards, and judicial review.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Given the existence of a constitutional right of scien-
tif. inquiry, it will be necessary to re-evaluate the process by which the decisions to
classify information are made.
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emotional well-being of its citizens by enacting a statute which precluded
the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution." The statute was
clearly an attempt by the state to control knowledge which it con-
sidered dangerous or offensive to the religious beliefs of a number of
its citizens.
Advances in the areas of external human fertilization,'59 fetal re-
search, 60 recombinant DNA, 1 and cloning 162 have likewise raised
issues concerning the potential danger to citizens from the knowledge
gained from research. 163 The knowledge gained from scientific work
may be considered "dangerous" in two respects. First, the knowledge
may be used by the government or others to create technologies which
could result in physical, moral, ethical, or social harm. Research into
the chemistry of the human mind could lead to the development of
158. The statute read:
§ 80-1627. Doctrine of ascent or descent of man from lower order of animals pro-
hibited.-It shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University,
College, Normal, Public School, or other institution of the State, which is supported
in whole or in part from public funds derived by State and local taxation to teach
the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of
animals and also it shall be unlawful for any teacher, a textbook commission, or
other authority exercising the power to select textbooks for above mentioned
educational institutions to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that
teaches the doctrine or theory that mankind descended or ascended from a lower
order of animals.
AREK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 (1960), reprinted in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 99 n.3
(1968).
The United States Supreme Court struck down the statute because it improperly pro-
moted a particular religious view of the origins of man. Id. at 107-09.
Arkansas has not given up its attempt to legislate the teaching and contents of science
within the public schools. A law which will be effective in the fall of 1982 requires the
teaching of creationism along with the theory of evolution. Sc[. NEWS, April 4, 1981, at
222.
159. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues
Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEO. L. J. 1295 (1979); Grobstein, External Human
Fertilization, SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1979, at 57.
160. Gaylin & Lappee, Fetal Politics: The Debate on Experimenting with the Unborn,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1975, at 66. Pilon & Juliana, Cost-Benefit Ethics and Fetal
Research, 3 HUMAN LIFE REV. 63 (1977).
161. Bereano, Recombinant DNA: Issues on the Regulation of Basic Scientific
Research, 20 IDEA 315 (1979); Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of
Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REv. 83 (1978).
162. All About Clones, NEWSWEEK, March 20, 1978, at 68; Kinney, Legal Issues of the
New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977).
163. In the area of recombinant DNA research, fear has been expressed that the
altruistic aims of the work may fall under the heartless rules of the marketplace. B. HAR-
ING, ETHICS OF MANIPULATION 159-211 (1975). It has also been argued that if the publication
of scientific knowledge results in social consequences to any person, the truth is not worth
knowing. LURIA, BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN GENETICS AND THE LAw 409
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1975).
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techniques which would make it possible for the government control
large segments of the population.'64 Second, the new scientific informa-
tion may be perceived by some to improperly influence an individual's
ideas or beliefs. For example, some believe that the present concept of
the family as an institution will be destroyed if through the use of new
medical techniques life is procreated outside of the family setting.'
Outside the area of national security, it is highly unlikely that the
government will ever be able to suppress scientific inquiry on the
basis of "dangerous knowledge." While the first amendment is not an
absolute bar to prior restraints, the Supreme Court has clearly stated
that any such retraint comes to the court bearing a heavy presumption
against validity. 6 '
When the first amendment was adopted, Congress was well aware
of the evils that flowed from the English licensing system which at-
tempted to control dangerous knowledge by requiring prior approval
of the state or church authorities before publication."' 7 Today, any at-
tempt to control dangerous knowledge outside of the area of scientific
inquiry would be unanimously recognized as contrary to the dictates of
the first amendment. That the knowledge is scientific should not lead
to a different result. Even if new scientific knowledge might ultimately
be used for illegal or unethical purposes, this should not, by itself,
justify a prior restraint. In these situations the alternative of more
speech is available to counteract any perceived improper use. Addi-
tionally, the state will be able to control the misuse of such knowledge
at the technological level.
164. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
165. As a result of solicitation by the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the following comments concerning in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer were received:
IT]here will be a strong demand for such extramarital uses of the clinical pro-
cedures-a demand which, if fulfilled, will further compromise "the virtues of family,
lineage, and heterosexuality" or weaken "the taboos against adultery and even in-
cest."
Other potential consequences considered adverse by some expert witnesses and
commentators include:
a. The development of commercial ovum and embryo banks.
b. The genetic selection or manipulation of early embryos.
c. The transfer of nuclei from adult individuals to early embryos, or cloning.
d. Extracorporeal gestation, or bringing an embryo all the way to viability in
the laboratory.
Protection of Human Subjects; HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer: Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,045 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
166. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714; Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
167. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 713.
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b. Restraints Not Directed at Expression
(i) The Test for Indirect Restraint
The government might seek to regulate scientific inquiry, not because
of the communicative content of scientific inquiry, but because of the
governmental interests in the health and safety of its citizens or the pro-
tection of the natural environment.' The advancement of these in-
terests may result in an indirect restraint on scientific inquiry. Problems
of indirect restraint most often arise when the government seeks to con-
trol the method used by a speaker to gather or disseminate ideas or in-
formation.'69
A government regulation which results in an indirect restraint on
speech is permissible if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the
government, (2) it furthers an important or substantial government in-
terest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, (4) the restriction is incidental, and (5) it is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
70
In the first instance any governmental regulation must be based on
proper constitutional authority; ie., the interest sought to be advanced
must be one of proper concern for the government. In the case of state
governments, the basis is normally the police power, which encom-
passes the power to protect or advance the public health, safety, or
welfare. 7 1 In the case of the federal government, the authority must
flow from one of the powers enumerated in the constitution; e.g., the
commerce power.
7 1
An examination of first amendment decisions indicates that the
Supreme Court has recognized the following interests as substantial
enough to justify the indirect abridgment of the freedom of expression:
Protection of the selective service system,'7 ' national security,74 grand
168. By way of analogy, the government may seek to insure a proper atmosphere for
children attending school by barring noisy demonstrations on streets adjoining schools
while classes are in session. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
169. Thus, a governmental regulation prohibiting the use of sound amplification equip-
ment in residential neighborhoods, while seeking to advance the government's interests in
protecting the well-being and tranquility of the community, would restrict an activity
which conveys information. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
170. This test was articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
171. For a classic discussion of state police power, see Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894) (regulation of the method of fishing); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855)
(regulation of the method of taking oysters).
172. See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 225-27.
173. In United States v. O'Brien, in affirming a conviction for knowingly destroying a
certificate issued by the Selective Service System, the Court held that Congress has a
legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the destruction of draft cards to insure
the availability of registrants for induction. 391 U.S. at 380.
174. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965).
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jury investigations,175 and the proper functioning of the penal system."6
The mere existence of a substantial interest, however, is not suffi-
cient to justify an indirect restraint. The regulations also must further
the interest asserted by the government. In Buckley v. Valeo 7V the
government argued that the expenditure ceiling of $1000 a year per
candidate in the Federal Election Campaign Act was necessary to stem
the reality or appearance of corruption in the election process. The
Supreme Court recognized that this goal was within congressional
authority but nevertheless struck down the provision because it failed
to further this interest.'79 The Court analyzed goals of the statute in
light of its own experience and concluded that "[iut would naively
underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much
difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express
advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the can-
didate's campaign."' 79 The Court thus decided Congress had misjudged
the effectiveness of this provision as a means of checking political cor-
ruption, and therefore found the expenditure portion of the statute to
be an unconstitutional abridgment of free expression.
When dealing with areas in which it has expertise, the Court ap-
pears to be willing to substitute its own judgment for that of the
legislative branch.9 ' In the area of science, however, the Court may
not have the expertise possessed by Congress or administrative agencies
and may be unwilling to substitute its judgment for theirs should a
175. In requiring that newsmen appear before a grand jury to give testimony, the
Court recognized the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand
jury investigations. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
176. In evaluating a state prison regulation relating to the censorship of mail, the
Court held that there was a "legitimate governmental interest in the order and security
of penal institutions [that justified] the imposition of certain restraints on inmate cor-
respondence." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974).
177. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 47-48. On the other hand, the Court found that the portion of the Act that
limited campaign contributions did further the governmental interest of a corruption-free
election process. Id at 26-27.
179. Id at 45.
180. The Court has engaged in this type of analysis when the restriction was directed
at the speech itself. For example, the prohibition on price advertising of prescription
drugs did not advance state interest in maintaining high professional standards for phar-
macists. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 766-70 (1976). In another situation the Court found that the prohibition of "for sale"
signs on residential real estate did not advance the state's interest in promoting racially
integrated housing. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977).
Finally, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980), the Court, while recognizing the village's interest in protecting its citizens from
fraud, crime, and undue annoyance, struck down as overbroad an ordinance that pro-
hibited solicitations by unqualified charitable organizations. Id. at 639.
I
Duquesne Law Review
case arise involving the regulation of scientific inqury. 18' Furthermore,
if the Court does attempt to determine whether the regulation furthers
a particular goal, the judgment must be based on either its own insuf-
ficient expertise or on a reevaluation of the expert testimony
presented at the trial of the case. It appears that the Court at present
is ill-equipped to determine whether a particular regulation of scien-
tific inquiry furthers an important government interest.
The requirement that the government's asserted interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression is really only another
way of saying that the reglulation must be facially neutral; that is, it
must not state or imply an intent to suppress ideas or information. It
has been argued by commentators that even a facially neutral regula-
tion may be struck down if it was motivated by an intent to directly
abridge speech."' The right of free expression would be meaningless if
the government could accomplish indirectly that which it could not ac-
complish directly. The Supreme Court, however, has shown an unwill-
ingness to examine the motives of legislative bodies. 3
A facially neutral regulation must only incidentally abridge freedom
of expression. If such a regulation effectively cuts off access or leaves
too little access to the channels of communication, it is unconstitu-
tional. ' A municipality, for example, may enact regulations designed
to further its interest in keeping streets and sidewalks free of litter. A
regulation banning the distribution of all handbills to futher this inter-
181. This reluctance to evaluate complex, technical subjects has already arisen in en-
vironmental law. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court in reviewing certain rule making activities of
the Atomic Power Commission stated, "The fundamental policy questions [nuclear energy]
appropriately resolved in Congress . . . are not subject to reexamination in the federal
courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action." I& at 558 (emphasis in
original). See also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699 (1979).
182. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 591-98. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 208-21 (1962); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct.: The Draft-Card Burn-
ing Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Ad-
ministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Ely].
183. In O'Brien the Court reiterated, "The decisions of this court from the beginning
lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise
of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the
power to be exerted." 391 U.S. at 383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56
(1904)). But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), where the court held that a violation of the equal protection clause could be
established by a showing that a law was passed with a racially discriminatory intent or
purpose. Id at 264-68.
184. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 682-83.
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est would not, however, be considered an incidental restraint since it
has foreclosed a method of communication protected by the first
amendment.8 '
Finally, a regulation must be no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of the governmental interest. The Supreme Court in Martin v.
Struthers"' struck down a municipal ordinance which prohibited ring-
ing door bells to distribute pamphlets since the privacy of individuals
could be protected by the less drastic alternative of making it a
criminal offense to ring a door bell after a home owner has made it ap-
parent that he does not wish to be disturbed.
While it is possible that the government might indirectly restrain
communication, observation, and formation of hypotheses, experimen-
tation is more likely to be affected since it is this component which
generates most of the potential problems and is least like pure speech.
When the government enacts regulations it most likely will be on the
basis of advancing its interest in protecting its citizens. Protection may
be required either because the experiment involves human subjects or
the experiment imposes an unacceptable danger or harm to the public
at large.
(ii) Human Experimentation
Assuming that experimentation is a necessary incident of speech,
the regulation of experimentation with human subjects by the state
would be permissible only if its satisfied the five point O'Brien test. 8'
Although it was not formulated with regulation of science in mind, to
illustrate how this test might operate in a typical regulatory setting, it
will be applied to the existing HEW regulations on human experimen-
tation.' The regulations expressly seek to safeguard the rights of sub-
185. The Supreme Court, in striking down an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
handbills because it allowed too little breathing space for communicative activities stated:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.
We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good ap-
pearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully
on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960).
186. 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
187. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
188. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.211 (1980). Although these
regulations are applicable only to HEW-funded research, they wfll be discussed as if they
were applicable to all experimentation.
It could be argued that while the regulations on their face are limited to controlling
Duquesne Law Review
ject at risk; that is, those subjects who may be exposed to the
possibility of physical, psychological, or social injury.'89 This goal is car-
ried out by requiring that the experimenter obtain the informed con-
sent of the subject as well as prior administrative approval."
The first question which must be considered is whether the protec-
tion of subjects at risk is within the constitutional power of the
governmental entity which has promulgated the regulation. If the
regulations are promulgated by a state government, then under the
concept of police power the state is able to protect or advance its
interests in protecting the individual from tortious or criminal
conduct.' On the other hand, if the regulations are imposed by the
federal government on all experimentation rather than as a condition
to obtaining federal grants, then the regulations must be based on
specific constitutional power.'92
The second element of the test requires that the regulations further
an important or substantial governmental interest. In this example the
two methods chosen by the government to protect the individual are
administrative approval of the experiment and informed consent. 9' The
grant money for research, they act as a de facto regulation of all research because the
federal government provides the vast majority of the funds for this work. A denial of
federal grants, therefore, is the equivalent of a legal prohibition.
189. Md. §§ 46.102, .103(b). While the regulations do not detail specific injuries, one
could presume the drafter had in mind tortious conduct such as assault, battery, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, or criminal conduct such as
manslaughter or other statutory crimes. See generally Greenblatt, The Ethics and Legali-
ty of Psychosurgery, 22 N.Y.L. ScI. L. REv. 961 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Greenblatt].
190. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.104, .109 (1980).
191. See Greenblatt, supra note 189, at 975-80.
192. The requirement that federal legislation be based on a specific constitutional
power is part of the doctrine of enumerated powers. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 225. The
most likely basis for supporting federal regulation of human experimentation would be
the commerce power. Id. at 238-44.
193. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (1980). The regulations give a fairly extensive definition of in-
formed consent.
(c) "Informed consent" means the knowing consent of an individual or his legally
authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other
form of constraint or coercion. The basic elements of information necessary to such
consent include:
(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes, in-
cluding identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be ex-
pected;
(3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected;
(4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advan-
tageous for the subject;
(5) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; [and]
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consent requirement would indeed further the governmental interest
since it protects a person against fraud or duress by insuring that he
is not the unwilling subject of a scientific experiment or participates in
the experiment without knowing the risks. If consent is obtained,
however, it is unclear from the regulations exactly what interest the
other requirement, prior administrative approval, seeks to further. If
the regulations have as their sole purpose the protection of the subject
from his own folly, they must be struck down as a violation of the sub-
ject's right of privacy.194 If the regulations seek to further some other
interest, they are silent as to what that interest may be. Other inter-
ests may include minimizing welfare costs incurred because of the in-
ability of the subject to care for himself or his dependents and prevent-
ing the injuries and death of subjects because they will be so alarming,
widespread and of such grave dimensions that they threaten the very
fabric of society.'95 Assuming that the regulations were redrafted so as
to reflect a proper interest, a court could determine whether the provi-
sions for administrative review further that interest.'98
(6) An instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to discon-
tinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to the
subject ....
Id. § 46.103(c).
Even with the above definition, however, there are significant legal problems with what
the courts will accept as informed consent, particularly when a legally authorized
representative is involved. It has been argued, for example, that a mother who is about to
abort a fetus is not capable of giving informed consent. Markey, Federal Regulation of
Fetal Research: Toward a Public Policy Founded on Ethical Reasoning, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 675, 684 (1977); Siegal, A Bias for Life, 4 HUMAN LIFE REV. 109, 116 (1975).
Another troublesome problem is that certain classes of individuals may never be
capable of giving informed consent. In Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, a
Michigan circuit court concluded that involuntarily detained mental patients cannot give
informed and adequate consent to experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain.
Civil No. 73-19, 434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich., July 10, 1973), reported in part in
42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973). The court's opinion is reproduced in A. BROOKS. LAW. PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-24 (1974). See also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
751-66 (1978).
Finally, since the entire process of scientific inquiry deals with unknown quantities,
there is always the problem of having sufficient information to determine the degree of
risk that will be actually faced. Thus truly "informed" consent may be illusive.
194. In analyzing the constitutionally of a statute which required the wearing of a pro-
tective helmet by motorcyclists a court stated: "We accept.., the fundamental tenet that
the relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for regulations
which have as their purpose and effect solely the protection of the individual from his
own folly." State v. Cotton, 516 P.2d 709, 710 (Hawaii 1973) (emphasis in original).
195. Id.; People v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 320, 247 N.W.2d 798, 800 (1976).
196. Recent advances in several areas of science have raised difficult definitional prob-
lems concerning whether a subject is human. In the area of external human fertilization
there is a question as to whether or not the joining of the sperm and egg creates a human
subject. If the subject is not human it is doubtful that the state could prohibit all research
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Turning to the third requirement of the O'Brien test, that the
governmental interest is unrelated to suppression of free expression,
the regulations are on their face neutral since they are not directed at
the ideas or information to be gained from the experimentation. These
regulations are merely restrictions on time, place, and manner since
they do not preclude research.
The fourth O'Brien test element deals with the incidental nature of
the restriction. The requirement of consent would most likely be con-
sidered to have only an incidental impact on expression since it allows
sufficient "breathing room" for experimentation. 19 Similarly, the re-
quirements for administrative review appear on their face to be no
more than an incidental restraint. Theoretically, this review procedure
will not have the effect of foreclosing or severely restricting ex-
perimentation with human subjects, but as a practical matter, it may
be found that the discretion to approve or disapprove a grant is overly
broad.'98 The basic standard in the regulation permits an institutional
review board to deny approval if it feels that the risks to the subject
are outweighed by the sum of the benefits to the subject and the value
of the knowledge to be gained from the experiment.'9 9 The regulations
contain no objective criteria for valuing either benefits or knowledge,
thus relegating the process to a subjective weighing of values.
The fifth O'Brien criterion requires that the regulation be no
greater than is essential to advance the government's interest. The re-
quirement of obtaining informed consent appears to be the least
restrictive means of futhering the governmental interest in protecting
its citizens against fraud or duress. The requirement is relatively unin-
trusive since it does not administratively or financially overburden the
researcher or the subject. Attempting to apply this criteria to the ad-
ministrative review board, however, is very difficult. As previously
mentioned, the regulations do not express a specific governmental inter-
est to be advanced by the adminstrative review board. Therefore, it is
impossible to determine if the least restrictive means have been
chosen to further an unstated interest.
In the area of fetal research, a number of states have sought to con-
in this area. The state's interest would probably be limited to regulating the humane use
of experimental subjects. See Grobstein, External Human Fertilization, SCIENTIFIC AM.,
June 1979, at 57.
197. See Ely, supra note 182, at 1335-36; see generally TRIBE, supra note 46, at 682-83.
198. In Saia v. State, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Court found that because of a lack of
standards in the ordinance, a sound truck permit system was an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the right of free speech. While admitting that the government has a right of
regulation, the Court held that when discretion is granted to a state official, sufficient
standards must be present to assure that the power is not abused.
199. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1980).
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trol scientific inquiry by enacting criminal laws which severely restrict
or prohibit research on fetal subjects."' Assuming that these statutes
operate as an indirect restraint on the constitutional right of scientific
inquiry, they also must satisfy the five point O'Brien test.' The first
point of the test requires that the intent sought to be advanced must
be one of proper concern for the state. While these statutes do not
precisely state what interest is being promoted, even if that interest is
the protection of human subjects they may be, at least in part, un-
constitutional.
In Roe v. Wade 2' the Supreme Court struck down a Texas criminal
statute which prohibited abortions except with respect to those pro-
cured or attempted upon medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. 3 The Court set forth interests which could become
compelling and thus justify the regulation of abortion.20 ' While
specifically recognizing that the state had an important and legitimate
interest in potential life, the Court held that this interest does not
become compelling until the point of viability.2 5 The Court also held
that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.' Based upon this rationale, the Court determined that a
woman's right of privacy had precedence over a state's interest until
the point of viability.
In light of Roe a state cannot justify its restrictions on fetal
research by asserting that the fetus is a legal person. If the statutes
are to be sustained, it would have to be on the basis of protecting
potential human life. Because there was a direct infringement of a fun-
damental right in Roe, the Court required the state's interest rise to
the level of "compelling. 20 7 Assuming that the fetal research statutes
only indirectly abridge the right of scientific inquiry, the state's infringe-
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 81-32,-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1593 (Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE 14-02.2-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1975); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6605 (Purdon 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (197T); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1953).
201. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
202. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
203. Id. at 166-67.
204. The three interests recognized are the state's interests in the mother's health,
maintaining proper medical standards, and protecting potential life. Id- at 163-64.
205. The Court said, "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability." Id. at 163.
206. Id. at 157-58.
207. Id at 155, 162-64.
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ment could be justified if the interest is substantial or important
rather than compelling."'
Various statutes impose liability depending on whether the experi-
ment is carried out in utero or ex utero and also on the status of the
fetus;2" that is whether the fetus is live, viable, or about to be aborted.
To the extent that the statutes protect a live fetus in utero they would
be consistent with the state's interest in protecting potential life.210
This interest would attach at the beginning of biological life and con-
tinue as long as the potential for human life exists.21 '
On their face, these statutes satisfy the second and third elements
of the O'Brien test since they further the important interest in protect-
ing potential life and do not appear to be aimed directly at the sup-
pression of scientific inquiry. The fourth element of the O'Brien test
requires that the statutes be no more than an incidental restraint on
scientific inquiry. Those statutes which would preclude all research ob-
viously violate this requirement.212 Most statutes do permit some
research and each would have to be analyzed to determine if sufficient
breathing room was allowed. At minimum the statutes should allow
scientific inquiry which would not jeopardize potential life. Finally, the
O'Brien test requires the restriction in these statutes be no greater
than that essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
Those statutes that impose criminal liability may violate this require-
208. The Court specifically recognized this distinction. See id
209. In the area of in utero fetal research, Utah, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301 (1953),
prohibits all experimentation with unborn children. Massachusetts, in MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981), and North Dakota, in N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.2-01 (Supp. 1977), prohibit experimentation with any live human fetus whether
before or after expulsion from the womb, unless the procedures are incident to the study
of a human fetus while in its mother's womb and such procedures do not substantially
jeopardize the life or health of the fetus. Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1593 (Supp.
1976)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979)), and Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.14(A) (Page 1975)), forbid all ex utero experimentation without reference to the
fetus being viable, non-viable, or dead. California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
25956(a) (West Supp, 1981), Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law.
Co-op Supp. 1981), and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.201 (Supp. 1977)) forbid all
ex utero experimentation on live fetuses, except to preserve the life or health of the
fetus.
210. The public ward theory might also justify control of in utero experimentation.
The state might claim that such statutes are necessary to prevent the social and financial
burden resulting from the birth of physically or mentally handicapped children. Based on
this approach, the Massachusetts statute prohibiting any experiment which substantially
jeopardized the health or life of the fetus which is carried to term could be justified.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
211. Under this approach, the state would have an interest even in the situation of a
fetus which is about to be aborted.
212. See IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14(A) (Page
1975).
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ment in that they may deter legitimate research by causing a scientist
to be unnecessarily cautious.
In the case of ex utero research, the existence of a state interest
will depend upon whether the potential for life is present. If the fetus
is ex utero and viable it is a human person and a state is entitled to
give it full protection. If the fetus is ex utero and non-viable it appears
that the state could not justify a restriction on research on the basis of
protecting potential human life.21
(iii) Experiments Which Impose Risk on the Public
The state may also regulate scientific inquiry which causes injury or
imposes risk upon the public,214 provided the five point O'Brien test is
satisfied. 15 The first three elements of the test pose no unusual prob-
lems when considering regulation of scientific inquiry in this context."6
Nevertheless, when regulations are intended to protect the public at
large and involve risk assessment, there is a possibility that they will
not permit sufficient breathing room for scientific inquiry. As required
by the fourth and fifth element of the O'Brien test, the court should
use a balancing process to determine whether there is sufficient
breathing room. The courts will weigh the extent to which scientific in-
quiry is prohibited against the magnitude of the benefits attained by
enforcing the regulation. For example, research studying the genetic
mutation of the bubonic plague bacillus would create certain risks to
the public but it would provide science with potentially useful
knowledge. In determining the extent of governmental interest, four
risk factors should be considered: (1) the probability that an event may
occur, (2) the probability of harm to any particular person or entity,
(3) the seriousness of the harm if it occurs, and (4) the number of per-
sons or entities affected if the harm arises. The risks are then weighed
against the value of the knowledge gained from the work to determine
whether regulation or prohibition of the work would be justified.
To provide a framework for analysis, while recognizing the desire of
society to protect human life whenever possible, all research will be
213. A secondary interest similar to that which justifies legislation requiring humane
treatment of animals might be used to justify regulation, but not prohibition of ex utero
experiments on a non-viable fetus. See Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENVTL
AFF. 205, 209-16 (1975).
214. The term harm to the public includes not only death or bodily injury to human
beings but also activities which can directly endanger life by damaging the environment
or ecosystem. This section differs from the prior section in that the public is not the sub-
ject matter of the experiment and also because consent is impossible.
215. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
216. Regulations that seek to protect citizens from vaguely defined perils such as
psychological or social injury, see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1980), may be insufficient to
satisfy the first requirement of the O'Brien test.
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placed into two categories. First, if an event may occur which will cer-
tainly result in death or serious injury to one or more persons, a
presumption would arise that the state's interest in protecting human
life outweights the value of the knowledge to be gained.217 In the case
of the bubonic plague research, even if there is a relatively low prob-
ability that the bacillus will escape the laboratory, the fact that death
or serious injury is certain to occur if it does escape would trigger the
presumption. This presumption could be overcome by the presentation
of evidence that the knowledge to be gained is of crucial importance to
the advancement of scientific or social goals.
The second category would encompass all other experimental work.
To justify a prohibition the state must establish either that the
knowledge to be gained is trivial or insignificant, or that the scope or
extent of the harm will be of such magnitude that it outweighs the
value of the knowledge to be gained. If serious injury or death is prob-
able rather than certain, or if only minor injury to persons or damage
to property is certain to occur, no presumption on behalf of the state
will arise.
While the application of the balancing process appears straight-
forward, when applied to a particular situation, it becomes readily ap-
parent that the quantification of the various factors may be formidable.
Some of the problems include choosing the proper units to measure
risk and value (ie., dollars, lives lost, aesthetics), making value
judgments in these units (ie., the dollar value of a human life), and
determining the probability of the occurrence of an event without ex-
tensive prior experience.218 Notwithstanding these difficulties, it will be
necessary in many cases to quantify these factors. The process should
not, however, be reduced to a purely mathematical operation.
Situations requiring the use of the balancing process could arise in a
broad spectrum of factual settings. At one extreme, both the occur-
rence of the event and the harm may have a high degree of prob-
ability. For example, the above parameters might be present in an ex-
periment that seeks to study earthquakes by triggering an earthquake
217. When it is certain that an event will occur which will cause injury, no further
balancing is necessary and the state may prohibit the work since no one may justify com-
mitting a tort or crime on the basis that it is a constitutionally protected activity. See,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 691.
218. Before weighing can occur, it is necessary to quantify the various risks as well as
the value of the scientific knowledge to be gained. This process has received much atten-
tion under the headings of "cost-benefit analysis" or "risk assessment." There is signifi-
cant disagreement as to the methodology as well as the ultimate usefulness of this pro-
cess. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Eco. L.Q. 207 (1978);
Symposium: Risk-Benefit Assessment in Governmental Decision Making, 45 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 901 (1977).
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which measures 9.5 on the open-ended Richter scale along the San An-
dreas Fault. Calculations show that there is an eighty percent prob-
ability that the tremors and shockwaves would extend into densely
populated areas causing death to one or more persons.
At the other end of the spectrum, both the occurrence of the event
and the harm may have a very low probability. Scientists at M.I.T., for
example, may wish to orbit a satellite observatory to study the forma-
tion of black holes and x-ray emitting stars.19 When the satellite falls
back to earth, as it ultimately will, there is a one in a billion chance
(.0000001%) that a window would be broken or some other injury caused
by the remains of the satellite.
In applying the balancing test to the first example, the state would
be justified in a prohibition of the experiment. The event, if it did occur,
would cause death to one or more persons. Since the sole purpose of
the experiment was to verify calculations based on prior naturally oc-
curring events, the value of the work, while slightly advancing scien-
tific knowledge, would not rebut the presumption in favor of the
government. Conversely, under the facts of the second example, the
state would not be justified in prohibiting the experimentation. Even
though the event is certain to occur, the likelihood of any harm is very
remote and any injury would be of a minor nature. When these factors
are weighed against the value of knowledge of the origins and nature
of the universe, the balance must be struck in favor of the research.
Between the two extremes suggested above lies a set of problems
which will be more difficult to solve. Recombinant DNA research
presents a situation in which there is some probability that an event
could occur which will result in an unknown degree of harm.20 The
primary concern is the escape of the recombinant DNA from the
laboratory. 1 The probability of the containment failure will depend
219. Black hole stars are described in detail by Isaac Asimov in THE COLLAPSING
UNIVERSE (1977).
220. Recombinant DNA research can be described as the process by which scientists
manipulate the genetic structure of a cell either by removal of chromosomes or by addi-
tion of chromosomes to a cell. The term "recombinant" refers to the process by which
scientists chemically cut the DNA molecule apart, insert new chromosomes and then
recombine its various fragments or portions into a new molecule. For a scientific discus-
sion of the process, see Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, SCIENTIFIC AM., July 1975, at 24.
221. In considering the problems of DNA recombinant research, a House Subcommit-
tee made the following observations:
At the basic research level, opponents enter the philosophical level of debate and
challenge the ability of investigators to ever quantify the benefits or the risk in a
fashion to permit evaluation and intelligent decision making. The fear has been ex-
pressed that DNA recombinant research may somehow adversely affect the diversi-
ty of natural gene pools....
There are frequent and detailed analogies drawn between the dilemmas con-
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upon the laboratory procedures followed in a particular experiment.'
These procedures may vary from the use of material in unprotected
labs to the employment of a biologically sealed room using filtered air
and glove boxes. Depending upon which procedure is used, the prob-
ability of a containment failure varies widely.'
If containment fails, then the probability of any harm occurring
must be assessed. Depending upon the ability of the organism to survive
fronted in the current nuclear power debates and the basic research proposals in
the field of DNA recombinant research. Statements, occasionally in the form of
demands, have been made that a full moratorium on all DNA recombinant research
should be instituted until all of the social, legal and moral implications of this
research have been thoroughly examined. Chargaff, for example, discussed the
"awesome irreversibility of what is being contemplated." ...
While it is more difficult to criticize the value of DNA recombinant work from
the perspective of potential therapeutic applications, even here there are strong oppos-
ing opinions. Part of this concern is directed toward the fact that much of the
research involves the use of E. coi, a microorganism which is a common inhabitant
of the human intestine. Since this is an organism already adapted to the human en-
vironment, the concern is that accidents might result in easy entry and infection of
human beings.
If the host with the recombinant molecule carried all or part of an oncogenic
virus, for example, or now had an unexpected resistance to drug therapy, or could
produce some new and unexpected toxin, then human beings might be exposed to a
disease which could reach epidemic proportions. The arguments about probabilities
of escape, probabilities of survival if escape does occur, and probabilities that such
an escaped host would indeed be pathogenic are described as impossible to
calculate and therefore meaningless in terms of evaluating potential risk. The posi-
tion is that the opportunity for risk exists and therefore the research should not be
conducted.
STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
GENETIC ENGINEERING, HUMAN GENETICS, AND CELL BIOLOGY 36-37 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON GENETIC ENGINEERING].
222. The proposed federal guidelines define the terms:
Containment is both physical and biological. Physical containment involves the
isolation of the research by procedures that have evolved over many years of ex-
perience in laboratories studying infectious micro-organisms. P1 containment-the
first physical containment level-is that used in most routine bacteriology
laboratories. P2 and P3 afford increasing isolation of the research from the environ-
ment. P4 represents the most extreme measure used for containing virulent
pathogens, and permits no escape of contaminated air, wastes, or untreated
materials. Biological containment is the use of biological agents that are crippled by
mutation so as to be incapable of surviving under natural conditions.
Recombinant DNA Research, Proposed Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042, 33,052
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Proposed Guidelines]. See also Recombinant DNA
Research, Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,912-21 (1976).
223. For example, in changing the location of an experiment from an open-front
biologically safe cabinet (P3) to a certified gas tight containment chamber (P4) there is at
least a 10,000 to 100,000 reduction in probability of escape. Where biological containment
is used, by requiring the use of a particular host vector system (HV2), the probability of
escape is less than 1 in 100,000,000. 1978 Proposed Guidelines, supra note 222, at 33,053.
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and propagate, as well as its potential to cause injury, there will be
varying probabilities of harm."
The third factor, the seriousness of the injury, can be anything from
a common cold to death.' Because DNA research involves a wide variety
of organisms, it is not possible to regulate based on broad, general
categories. Each classification of organism presents its own potential
for harm. If the agent which escapes is certain to cause death or
serious injury, a presumption would arise that the state's interest in
prohibition outweighs the value of the knowledge gained from the
work.' The presumption could be rebutted by the proponent of the
work presenting evidence that the knowledge to be gained is of crucial
224. Because of the nature of this work, it presents the risk of producing by recom-
bination of genetic characteristics a life form which might inadvertently escape into the
environment and (1) produce human cancer or some other widespread infection, (2) in-
crease antibiotic resistance in pathogenic organisms, (3) permit the survival of pathogens
in environments not normally amenable to survival, or (4) possibly upset the natural
evolutionary process. REPORT ON GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 221, at 36-37.
In May of 1981, a special governmental investigation found that Martin J. Cline had im-
properly used recombinant DNA within a human subject. This is the first violation of the
guidelines for the use of recombinant DNA which also violated the guidelines for human
experimentation. No apparent harm to the human subjects was reported. Sc. NEWS, June
6, 1981, at 357.
225. Death might be caused by such pathogenic agents as Dengue virus or
Schistososma Mansoni.
226. Because of the seriousness of the potential injury the present HEW regulation
prohibits the following work:
I-D. Prohibitions. The following experiments are not to be initiated at the present
time:
I-D-1. Formation of recombinant DNA's derived from the pathogenic organisms
classified(1) as class 3, 4, or 5(2) or from cells known to be infected with such
agents, regardless of the host-vector system used.
I-D-2. Deliberate formation of recombinant DNA's containing genes for the
biosynthesis of potent toxins (e.g ... venoms from insects, snakes, etc.).
I-D-3. Deliberate creation by the use of recombinant DNA of a plant pathogen
with increased virulence and host range beyond that which occurs by natural
genetic exchange.
I-D-4. Deliberate release into the environment of any organism containing recom-
binant DNA.
I-D-5. Deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait to micro-organisms that are
known to acquire it naturally, if such acquisition could compromise the use of a
drug to control disease agents in human or veterinary medicine or agriculture.
I-D-6. Large-scale experiments (e.g., more than 10 liters of culture) with
organisms containing recombinant DNA's, unless the recombinant DNA's are
rigorously characterized and are shown to be free of harmful genes.(8)
We differentiate between small- and large-scale experiments with organisms con-
taining recombinant DNA's because the probability of escape from containment bar-
"riers normally increases with increasing scale.
43 Fed. Reg. 33,070 (1978).
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importance to the advancement of science.' If the escape of the agent
presents only a chance of permanent injury or death, then the work
should be permitted unless the state establishes that the knowledge to
be gained is de minimis or, that the scope or extent of harm will be of
such magnitude that it outweighs the value of the knowledge to be
gained. For example, the escape of foot and mouth disease virus, or
sheep pox virus could cause widespread damage to animal herds, but
not present a health hazard to humans. Once the state establishes that
this widespread damage would occur, then the burden would shift to
the proponent of the work to present evidence that the value of the
knowledge to be gained from the work outweighs the harm.
In the above example, as well as other cases, there is the recurring
problem of the value of scientific knowledge. In making this value
judgment, the court should determine the degree to which the par-
ticular scientific knowledge is critical to the advancement of science in
that area and the importance of the research to society. If biochemists
were prohibited from doing recombinant DNA work it would severely
hamper further efforts to decode human genes which may ultimately
lead to an understanding of the causes of many hereditary diseases.'
Finally, even if the regulations satisfy the first four elements of the
O'Brien test, they also must employ the least restrictive means of
regulation. If the state can minimize or eliminate the risk involved by
the use of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions rather than
the prohibition, it must do so. This approach has been used in the present
HEW regulations specifying physical and biological containment pro-
cedures to be used in carrying out recombinant DNA experiments.'
The five point O'Brien test was formulated by the Court to deal
with indirect restraints on free speech. It is apparent that this test can
be successfully employed to evaluate government regulation of scien-
tific inquiry. The application of this test will provide the necessary
guidance for the drafting of regulations which do not infringe on the
right of scientific inquiry. By employing the O'Brien test it will be
possible to give full protection to the right of scientific inquiry while
allowing the government to advance its legitimate interests.
227. This procedure is recognized under current HEW regulations:
Experiments in these categories may be excepted ... from the prohibitions ... [as
described in note 223] provided that these experiments are expressly approved by
the Director, NIH, on recommendation of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Commit-
tee after appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment. In making such
exceptions, weight will be given both to scientific and societal benefits and to
potential risks.
Id.
228. Goodman, Genetic Engineering and Biochemistry, in SCIENCE FACT 128-35 (F.
George ed. 1978).
229. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 33,069-178 (1978).
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B. Scientific Inquiry as a Fundamental Right Standing Alone
While the first amendment provides a basis for supporting a con-
stitutional right of scientific inquiry, it is not the only, nor even
possibly the best, basis for this right. The Supreme Court has recognized
certain rights not expressly enunciated in the Constitution as so basic
and fundamental that they are entitled to constitutional protection.
The right to travel, for example, is not specifically mentioned any-
where in the Constitution, yet the Court as early as 1849 found such a
right to exist."' Justice Stewart has suggested that the reason for its
absence is that the right is so elementary that the founding fathers
felt it was unnecessary to provide for it specifically."'
Other rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but which
nevertheless receive its protection include the right of privacy, 2 family
rights,'s the right to be free from intellectual coercion by the govern-
ment,'s the right to obtain useful knowledge,m and the right to vote
and to have one's vote be worth as much as another's" 6
Since the language of the Constitution is not the source of the above
enumerated rights, it is necessary to go beyond it. It has been
suggested that there are two other possible sources from which fun-
damental rights flow. One is the constitutional structure and the
values which that structure implies; 7 the second possible source is the
Court itself.'
230. In his dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848),
Chief Justice Taney stated:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are
one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and,
as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.
Id. at 492. See also New York v. O'Neil, 359 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1959); id. at 12-16 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Williams v.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
231. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
232. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
233. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
234: West Viriginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Tribe, supra note 46, at 899-902.
235. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S 390
(1923).
236. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
237. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV.
981, 1031 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Lupul. In his article, Professor Lupu postulates that
structural concerns moved the Court to protect the right of interstate travel, and possibly
certain voting rights. Id.
238. The cases involving a right of privacy can be grouped under this heading. Id. at
1032. The validity of, as well as the theoretical basis for, this second source has been the
1981
Duquesne Law Review
1. Sources Within the Constitution-A Structural Basis
While the right of scientific inquiry is not expressly authorized in
the Constitution, the word science does appear within the text of the
document. The Constitution's patent clause provides: "[t]he Congress
shall have power . .. to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.""s
While there is a lack of specific historical and legal authority ex-
plaining the background of this clause, a number of unstated premises
can be inferred from its presence. First of all, the mere presence of the
term science in this clause indicates that science and the scientific pro-
cess were known to the founding fathers. Second, given the limited
number of topics addressed in the Constitution, apparently the
drafters felt that science was of such importance that its progress
should be promoted by federal governmental protection. Third, the
drafters recognized that the principal agents in the promotion of
science and the useful arts were authors and inventors. Fourth, this
clause directs Congress to promote science and the useful arts, not by
granting to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their
writings and discoveries but by securing them. From this it can be in-
ferred that individuals already possessed these rights and that the
government was only furnishing protection.240 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, if authors and inventors had an exclusive right to their writings
and inventions, the drafters must have presupposed freedom to engage
in the activities which produced these products.
While there is little historical material which would refute the
above inferences, two potential problems must be considered. It might
subject of much debate. There are critics who assert that only those activities should be
protected which are specifically referred to in the text of the Constitution or where there
are demonstrable standards to guide the Court. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
510-24 (Black, J., dissenting).
Others have argued against the process of finding fundamental rights by making a
judicial value judgment since it is too subjective. Professor Ely states that such criteria
as natural law, neutral principles, reason, or the idea of progress are not adequate stan-
dards. Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term-Forewor& On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 22-54 (1978).
Those who support the use of judicial value judgments argue with equal vigor that it is
possible for the Court to formulate fundamental rights using proper standards. Tushnet
proposes the following criteria as a standard: (1) general agreement on the social impor-
tance of that right and (2) the settled weight of responsible opinion. Tushnet, The Newer
Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV.
261.
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
240. H. Forman, in 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH & AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT LAW 27 (ABA ed. 1977).
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be argued that the term science as used in the patent clause would not
include science as we know it today. During the revolutionary period
the term science had a broader meaning than it has now.2" ' It encom-
passed all bodies of organized knowledge including natural philosophy
and natural history,"2 two disciplines which encompassed the study of
subjects which were the forerunners of modern sciences such as
physics, zoology, and astronomy.243 Since natural philosophy and
natural history were included within the term science, modern science
would also be included.
The second potential problem arises because the patent clauses
employ the term inventor rather than scientists. At the time the Con-
stitution was drafted, inventor meant, first, one who discovers; and sec-
ond, one who creates something new.24" ' The first meaning would in-
clude the activity of experimentation as carried out by modern scien-
tists. The goal of any experiment is to find or discover information
about the universe. Therefore, the term inventor as used in the patent
clause is certainly broad enough to include the present day scientist.
Given that science is found within the structure of the Constitution
and that scientific inquiry is basically a search for knowledge, 5 addi-
tional support for a fundamental right can be found in the decisions of
the Supreme Court. On a number of occasions the Court has recognized
a right to pursue knowledge. The Court has associated this fundamen-
tal right with a number of amendments. In Meyer v. Nebraska the
241. In the seventh edition of Johnson's Dictionary, "science" is defined as:
"1. Knowledge 2. Certainty grounded on demonstration 3. Art attained by precepts, or
built on principles 4. Any art or species of knowledge 5. One of the seven liberal arts:
grammar, rhetorick, logick, arithmetick, musick, geometry, astronomy." JOHNSON'S DIc.
TIONARY (7th ed. 1785).
242. It is interesting to note that James Madison, one of the authors of the patent
clause, initially suggested the following language for the clause: "To encourage by
premiums and provisions, the advance of useful knowledge and discoveries. To secure to
literary authors their copy rights for a limited time." 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 10, at 74 (1964) [hereinafter cited as DELLER]. When adopted by the Constitutional Con-
vention without dissent the phrase "the advance of useful knowledge and discoveries" was
replaced with the phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Id at
73-75. Thus, it may be inferred that the convention considered progress of science and
useful knowledge to be equivalent terms.
243. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 7. In Benjamin Franklin's proposal for the formation of an
American Philosophical Society, subtitled "a proposal for promoting useful knowledge .... "he
suggested that various topics including botany, medicine, geology, mathematics, and
chemistry ought to be discussed. He also suggested that there always be "at least seven
members viz. a physician, a botanist, a mathematician, a chemist, a mechanician, a geographer
and a general natural philosopher." BENJAMIN FRANKLIN READER 319 (Goodman ed. 1945).
244. DELLER, supra note 242, § 10 at 89-90. It is this second definition which has
become the popular meaning of the term.
245. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
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court stated that the term liberty in the fourteenth amendment included
the right to acquire useful knowledge. 2 6 In Griswold v. Connecticut
Justice Douglas, after citing Meyer, stated: "[t]the State may not, con-
sistently with the spirit of the First Amendment contract the spec-
trum of available knowledge.
'247
Logically, if the Court is willing to protect such a right in the
general sense, it would certainly do so in the specific case of scientific
inquiry. This conclusion is further reinforced by Justice Douglas'
observation, in discussing the the purpose of the patent clause, that
"[t]he invention to justify a patent had to serve the ends of science-to
push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge." ' Since the purpose of
the patent clause was to advance scientific knowledge and the Court
has recognized the importance of the pursuit of knowledge, it appears
to follow that the scientist would have the right to engage in the pur-
suit of knowledge through scientific inquiry.
In addition to the patent clause, other sections of the Constitution
assume a close working relationship between science and government.
One author notes these examples:
That the power over coinage, weights, and measures would necessarily
entail highly technical expert advice and scientific experimentation was
axiomatic to educated men. A census was provided not so much
because of curiosity as because the political compromises made it
necessary; nevertheless the men of that time could visualize scientific
uses for it."4
The patent clause provides a structural basis supporting a constitu-
tional right of scientific inquiry. This conclusion flows from a logical
analysis of the clause itself and is further supported by an examination
of the historical context in which the clause was drafted. °
2. Sources Outside the Constitution
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of certain fun-
damental rights not specifically mentioned in the Constitution prin-
246. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). For a discussion of the case, see note 251 infra.
247. 381 U.S. at 482. For a discussion of the case, see note 251 infra. See also Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), where Justice Frankfurter stated: "By limiting the
power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry and
freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what
their calling." Id at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
248. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
249. A. DUPREE. SCIENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 (1957).
250. See text accompanying notes 251-301 infra. While this historical analysis is in-
tended to support the second source of fundamental rights, it also lends support to the
structural analysis.
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cipally by an expansive interpretation of the ninth and fourteenth
amendments.n' In doing this the Court has stated the test somewhat
differently in each situation rather than formulating a single test for
the determination of fundamental rights in all situations."
Professor Lupu has distilled the various statements of the Court into
a two-part test to determine whether a right will receive protection
under our Constitution. "(1) Historically, American institutions must
have recognized the liberty claim as one of paramount stature," and
251. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), a Nebraska statute which prohibited
the teaching of foreign languages until after the eighth grade was at issue. The Court
struck down the statute as an unreasonable infringement on "the liberty guaranteed ...
by the 14th amendment." Id. at 399.
An ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single fami-
ly was at issue in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court found
that the statute as applied to the appellant and her grandsons was a violation of their
substantive due process rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
499-500.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a Connecticut anti-contraception
statute. Three concurring Justices relied on the ninth and fourteenth amendments. See
381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the state could not com-
pel members of the Amish faith to send their children to high school until age 16. This
was based upon the Court's reading of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 234.
The right to privacy was found to exist within the fourteenth amendment by the Court
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. For a discussion of Roe, see text accompanying notes
202-06 supra.
252. Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), recognized the difficulty in
formulating an all inclusive test when he stated:
[Tlhe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion ...
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ....
Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
One of the first articulations of the scope of the term "fundamental right" came in
Meyer where Justice McReynolds observed,
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.
262 U.S. at 399. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the right was recognized as fundamental because
it reflected "strong tradition" founded on "the history and culture of Western
civilization." 406 U.S. at 232. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, spoke of a right
that is fundamental and deeply rooted in our society. 381 U.S. at 491. In Moore the Court
protected the sanctity of the family "because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." 431 U.S. at 503.
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"(2) Contemporary society must value the asserted liberty at a level of
high priority."'
a. The Historical Role of Science
As will be demonstrated in the following material, America
historically has recognized scientific inquiry as a liberty of paramount
stature. From the earliest colonial times, the growth of American
political and educational institutions paralleled the development of
science and the philosophy of Enlightenment.' Indeed, the maturing of
the United States was intertwined with the growth of Enlightenment.
The scientific work of Isaac Newton in England during the seven-
teenth century sparked the beginning of the Enlightenment Era in
Europe. 5 Newton's method of inquiry consisted of three basic steps:
the observing of the events, the accurate recording of events, and the
discerning of natural laws from these observations."' Through the use
of this method, Newton developed the law of universal gravitation.
While the scientific principles he discovered would be the foundation
of physics until Einstein's work 250 years later, his scientific way of
thinking had an equally important impact beyond the boundaries of
pure science.
Newton's method of ordering the inanimate universe provided an in-
tellectual tool by which man could seek to discern the laws which
govern the broad spectrum of human activities.'1 The Newtonian ap-
proach was the basis for the work of many writers in diverse areas in-
cluding John Locke (epistemology), David Hume (ethics and morality),
Adam Smith (economics), Locke and Voltaire (politics), Thomas Ried
(moral philosophy), and finally, William Petty, Michel Turgot, Jean
253. Lupu, supra note 237, at 1040-41.
254. Enlightenment was a movement of thought and belief, developed from inter-
related conceptions of God, reason, nature, and man, to which there was wide assent in
Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. Its dominant conviction was that right reason-
ing could find true knowledge and could lead mankind to felicity.
255. If any one event can be designated the starting point for the Era it would be the
1687 publication of Isaac Newton's Philosophical Naturals Principia Mathematic by the
Royal Society in London. The Royal Society itself and been formed in 1663 for the promo-
tion of seeking new knowledge, particularly of a scientific nature. From its beginning
until 1783, 39 of the individuals elected to the society were from North America. STEARNS,
supra note 26, at 107-08.
256. A letter written by Benjamin Franklin 90 years later confirmed this as his pro-
cess of inquiry: "[B]ut I approve much more your method of philosophizing which proceeds
upon actual observations, makes a collection of facts and concludes no farther than those
facts will warant." C. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 660 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
VAN DOREN].
257. B. HINDLE, THE PURSUIT OF SCIENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1735-1789, at 318
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HINDLE]; WILLS, supra note 76, at 95.
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Condordet, and Francios-Jean Chastellus (government).' These in-
dividuals, among others, constituted the bridge between Newtonian
science and the political concerns of the American colonies.
The colonial leaders of the mid-eighteenth century, while ap-
preciating the practical consequences of science in such areas as farm-
ing and manufacturing, also sought to apply the principles of science to
human affairs. "The Enlightenment recognized no fundamental dif-
ferences between knowledge of physics and astronomy and knowledge
of government and economics." 59 Many persons, including many
political leaders, believed that application of the Newtonian process to
all human endeavors would utlimately yield laws as precise as the
physical sciences.26
Science during the period in question was not a separate category
engaged in by a specialist, rather it was a philosophical outlook that
applied the principles of Bacon and Newton to all human endeavors."'
Research in "hard" sciences like physics, chemistry, and astronomy
was not of overwhelming importance during this period. While many
hoped that the application of hard science would result in technological
innovation, the true importance of science was not the practical,
technical consequences but the intellectual framework that was applied
to so many human endeavors.
Discovering historical information to substantiate the assertion that
Newtonian thought was part of the intellectual process of the time is
very difficult.262 Because of its broad acceptance there was little discus-
sion of the fundamental principles. In order to establish that American
institutions held scientific inquiry in high esteem, one must examine
the attitudes, education, and accomplishments of the leaders of these
institutions.
During the eighteenth century, the curricula of various colleges
were fairly uniform. All students studied basically the same material;
there was no system of electives as presently exists in higher educa-
258. Francois-Jean Chastellus had a calculus by which one could determine whether or
not a particular ruler was a tyrant. See WILLS. supra note 76, at 111-48.
259. HINDLE, supra note 257, at 377.
260. Hindle observes, "Acceptance of prevailing political concepts rested upon and
demanded acceptance of the central importance of science. The more the Americans
clarified their own political position, the more it came to seem desirable to promote
science in all its phases." Id at 382.
261. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 5-6.
262. From a modern perspective, it is equivalent to trying to generate material to sup-
port the position that the free enterprise system was accepted by the vast majority of in-
dividuals in the United States during the 1950-60's. If one cannot use public opinion polls,
which did not exist during the early American history, what may be used to prove the
proposition?
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tion.2 0 One scholar has estimated that twenty to twenty-five percent of
college study was devoted to scientific topics.2 An examination of the
textbooks and teaching approaches of the time reveals that the prin-
ciples of Newton and the Englightenment predominated.2 65 Thus,
graduates of eighteenth century American universities were well versed
in science and scientific thought. They were familiar with the simplicity
and perfection of Newton's laws and were taught that the use of
Newton's rational scientific methods would lead to true knowledge.
Many of these university graduates went on to become the leaders
of the American revolution. Of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration
of Independence, twenty-six had college educations.6 In addition to
those with college training, another thirteen signers received less formal
education by tutors or professional training in law or medicine.
2 7
Others who also played an important role in the revolution and who
would go on to help draft the Constitution were also university trained.268
Further evidence supporting the importance of science in this period
can be found in the scientific interests and accomplishments of many of
the Revolutionary leaders. George Washington was a surveyor and
agronomist, Nathaniel Green was a manufacturer and inventor, Josiah
Bartlett was a medical authority, and Manasseh Cutler an astronomer
and botanist.2 9
263. T. HORNBERGER, SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT IN THE AMERICAN COLLEGES 22-34 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as HORNBERGER].
264. The list included mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, agriculture,
astronomy, and natural history. Id- at 29.
265. Id. at 48-69. See also D. STRUIK. YANKEE SCIENCE IN THE MAKING 24-26 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as STRUIK].
266. Harvard: Samuel Adams (1740), John Adams (1755), Robert Paine (1749), Elbridge
Gerry (1762), William Ellery (1747), William Williams (1751), William Hooper (1760). Yale:
Oliver Wolcott (1747), Philip Livingston (1737), Lewis Morris (1746), Lyman Hall (1747).
College of Philadelphia (now Univ. of Pa.): Francis Hopkinson (1757), William Paca (1759).
Princeton: Benjamin Rush (1762), Richard Stockton (1748). William & Mary: Carter Brax-
ton (1761), Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Jefferson (1760-62). Foreign Studies: John Withers-
poon (Univ. of Edinburg, 1739), James Wilson (Univ. of Edinburg, 1763) Charles Carroll
(French Jesuit Colleges), Richard Henry Lee (Wakefield, England), Thomas Nelson (Christ
College, Cambridge, England), John Penn (Univ. of Geneva 1747-51), Edward Rutledge
(London), Arthur Middleton (England).
267. Doctors: John Bartlett, Matthew Thornton. Lawyers (with date of admission):
Roger Sherman (1754), Jason Smith (1745), George Ross (1750), George Read (1753),
Thomas McKean (1754), Samuel Chase (1761), Thomas Stone (1764), George Wythe, George
Walton (1774), Thomas Heyward (1771). Education by private tutor: Francis Lightfoot Lee,
John Morton.
268. Alexander Hamilton attended Kings College, James Madison was a graduate of
Princeton (1771), and both John Marshall and James Monroe attended William and Mary
College.
269. STRUIK. supra note 265, at 40.
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David Rittenhouse, one of America's first astronomers, was also active
in the American Revolution.10 He was close to the Adams faction in
Congress"' and was also a personal friend and long-time correspondent
of Jefferson. 2 Jefferson considered Rittenhouse America's supreme
mechanic."
John Adams, who is best remembered for his leadership in the fight
for the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, showed con-
siderable support for, and interest in, science." After receiving his formal
education in science and mathematics at Harvard he continued to pursue
his interest in these areas. His library contained works by Archimedes,
Euclid, Newton, Halley, Buffon, and Linaeus. 5 Adams was also in-
terested in scientific collections and while in France visited such collec-
tions when time permitted.' So great was Adams' devotion to the ad-
vancement of science that even the war could not deter his efforts. In
1779 he persuaded the Massachusetts General Court to charter the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 7 Adams, as well as such
famous political leaders as John Hancock and James Bowdorn, were
among the sixty-two charter membersY8
Adams' great interest in science also influenced his view of political
events and the operation of government. He viewed the events sur-
270. See WILLS, supra note 76, at 100-14.
271. All of the delegates to Congress had received complimentary copies of his great
address on astronomy. Id at 31.
272. Id. at 30.
273. The term mechanic meant one who dealt with Newtonian physics. Id. at 100.
274. See STRUm, supra note 265, where the author writes:
John Adams' scientific interests are illustrated in a letter to Benjamin Waterhouse,
concerning the education of his son, John Quincy Adams, in Paris. In this letter
Adams writes that he "attempted a sublime flight" and after the books of Euclid in
Latin, plane trigonometry, algebra and conic sections, tried to give him "some idea
of the differential method of calculation of the Marquis de rHopital, and the method
of fluxions and infinite series of Sir Isaac Newton."
Id. at 362.
275. Id. at 42.
276. Id. at 43.
277. The Academy was organized by Adams with the help of James Bowdorn, Dr.
Samuel Cooper, Manasseh Cutler, and Ipswich Hamlet. STEARNS, supra note 26, at 683.
The goals and purposes of the Academy are stated in its charter:
As the Arts and Sciences are the foundation and support of agriculture, manufac-
ture and commerce; as they are necessary to the wealth, peace, independence, and
happiness of the people; as they essentially promote the honor and dignity of the
government which patronizes them; and as they are most effectually cultivated and
diffused through a State by the forming and incorporating of men of genius and
learning into public societies ....
STRUIK, sup'a note 265, at 44.
278. STRUM, supra note 265, at 44-45.
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rounding the Revolution as a process open to scientific observation and
description. 9 When the Constitution was criticized as not sufficiently
scientific, Adams sought to refute the charge by using the scientific
method to analyze the parallel growth of science and government."0
Thomas Jefferson was in the forefront of scientific thought in
Revolutionary America. While Jefferson enjoyed tinkering and propos-
ing ideas and theories, he was not an experimenter like Franklin.28" ' Jef-
ferson adopted the scientific or Newtonian philosophy and applied it to
all his endeavors. This outlook is clearly reflected in his two major
writings. The first was the Declaration of Independence: "The Declara-
tion's opening is Newtonian. It lays down the law .. these few words
put us firmly in the age of scientific revolution. In the flow of things
there is perceivable necessity, a fixity within flux." 2 In his book In-
venting America, Gary Wills devotes a seventy page section to show-
ing how Jefferson's Newtonian outlook was reflected in the Declaration
of Independence. 8 ' Jefferson's approach was not scientific in today's
technical sense, but it was as if the glasses by which he viewed the
world were tinted with the colors of science.
Jefferson's second major writing, and his only book-length work,
was Notes on the State of Virginia."' As noted by one editor, the book
is representative of the Newtonian approach in its clear observation
and recording of detailed descriptions. In a time when most scientific
activity in America consisted of gathering information of the natural
world, this book stands out as a prime example of scientific work."5
279. WILLS, supra note 76, at 95.
280. Hindle states:
John Adams' Defence of the Constitutions was an endeavor to refute the charge by
applying scientific principles to the evaluation of government. "The arts and
sciences, in general," he began, "during the three or four last centuries, have had a
regular course of progressive improvement . . . is it not unaccountable that the
knowlege of the construction of free governments, in which the happiness of life,
and even the further progress of improvement in education and society, in
knowledge and virtue, are so deeply interested, should have remained at a full
stand for two or three thousand years?" He went on the classify and characterize
many ancient and modern governments much as the botanists classified their
plants.
HINDLE, supra note 257, at 377.
281. WILLS, supra 76, at 99, 131.
282. IL at 93.
283. Id at 91-164.
284. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187-288. (A. Koch & W.
Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS].
285. In introducing the work, the editors state:
Important not only as a notable contribution to American scientific writing (form-
ulating priciples of scientific geography later developed by von Humboldt), it has
been praised by reputable twentieth-century historians of science as the most in-
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In the case of Jefferson it is fairly easy to determine the influences
that helped shape his ultimate philosophy. Professor William Small and
Lieutenant Governor Francis Fauquier were two of the key influences
on young Jefferson while he studied at the College of William and
Mary, 6 and when he subsequently studied law. Both men can be
directly linked to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. William Small,
the Scottish professor, was extensively trained in Enlightenment
thought ' and, as a professor of natural philosophy, was responsible for
teaching many categories of modern science.s He was one of the
bridges between Newtonian physics and men like Jefferson who acted
upon the Newtonian belief that even human actions were governed by
natural laws.
Francis Fauquier was born in London and resided as a country
gentlemen in Hertfordshire until sent to represent the Crown's inter-
est in Virginia. His family background and professional life included a
number of connections to science. 9 It is not unlikely that his interest
in the science influenced Jefferson.
Jefferson's noted biographer, Dumas Malone, summarized this form-
ative period of his life by saying:
There is little question that, before he stepped on the public stage,
he had arrived at his abiding conviction that human intelligence can
unlock not only the treasure house of the past but also the secrets of
the universe, thus leading mankind onward to a richer and better life,
and that he personally was proceeding on that assumption.'
Evidence of Jefferson's attitude toward the importance of Newton-
ian reasoning can be found in his correspondence, much of it coming
after his two terms as President."l Later in his life Jefferson referred
fluential scientific book written by an American. The Notes continue to be of in-
terest for the clarity, vigor, and occasional beauty of Jefferson's prose.
Id. at 186.
286. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 102-03 (1948) [hereinafter cited as MALONE].
287. For a discussion of the broad impact of Scottish thinking on Americans, see
WILLs, supra note 76, at 175-80. Some of Professor Small's friends included James Watt
(inventor of the steam engine) and Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles Darwin and
active in science himself). MALONE, supra note 286, at 53.
288. When Jefferson arrived, "[Small] was there, teaching physics, metaphysics, and
mathematics, and through force of circumstances was soon teaching practically everything
else." MALONE, supra note 286, at 51. Another author considers Small to have been the
greatest rival o Professor Winthrop of Harvard. HORNBERGER, supra note 263, at 61.
289. MALONE, supra note 286, at 76.
290. Id at 101.
291. In a 1789 letter to Dr. Willard, President of Harvard, Jefferson commented upon
how open the field of natural history, botany, mineralogy, and zoology in America ap-
peared to be:
It is the work to which the young men, whom you are forming, should lay their
hands. We have spent the prime of our lives in procuring them the precious bles-
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to Bacon, Locke, and Newton as the trinity of immortals that initiated
the great intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment. 2 While "Jeffer-
son did not introduce the Enlightenment into the colonies . . . he
became its almost perfect embodiment and, after Franklin, its most
conspicuous apostle on this side of the Atlantic." 3
No man did more for the advancement of science during the Revolu-
tionary period than Benjamin Franklin, an authentic American hero.
He was a great scientist in his own right, a leader in the promotion of
scientific education and scientific organizations, inventor, author, and
diplomat."'
Franklin was probably America's first true experimentalist. His best
known work was in the field of electricity. In the six years between
1746 and 1752 Franklin made his fundamental contributions in this
area when he flew the famous kite establishing that lightning was elec-
tricity and had a fluid nature.S Through periodic publications he in-
formed the scientific world of his work in electricity.' Because of his
remarkable efforts in this area, he received several awards, the ad-
miration and respect of scientists worldwide and the wondrous praise
of the public." 7 Throughout his life Franklin continued to pursue scien-
tific questions. As was typical of the period, the scope of his interest
sing of liberty. Let them spend theirs in showing that it is the great parent of
science and of virtue; and that a nation will be great in both, always in proportion
as it is free.
LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 284, at 468.
In a letter to General Kosciusko in 1810, Jefferson discussed his life at Monticello, and
his new role helping young men in their studies. "In advising the course of their reading,
I endeavor to keep their attention fixed on the main object of all science [ie., knowledge
gained by Newtonian thought] the freedom and happines of man." Id. at 600.
A final example can be found in the last letter Jefferson is known to have written. In
this June 1826 letter he reflected upon the 50th anniversary of American independence
and stated:
That form [of government] which we have substituted, restores the free right to
the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or
opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already
laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been
born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to
ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others.
Id. at 729-30.
292. MALONE, supra note 286, at 101.
293. Id. at 101-02.
294. See generally VAN DOREN, supra note 256.
295. Id. at 156-64.
296. Some of his publications included Opinions and Conjectures, concerning the Pro-
perties and Effects of the Electrical Matter (1749) and Experiments and Observations on
Electricity (1751). His writings were translated into French, German, and Italian, and
even as late as 1769 he was releasing an updated 4th edition. Id. at 160, 162, 171, 248.
297. Id. at 174, 661.
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encompassed meteorology, zoology, physics, chemistry, geology, and
oceanography.21
Franklin also sought to promote science among the various societal
institutions of the period. As early as 1743, Franklin outlined a com-
prehensive plan for the cooperative promotion of science on an inter-
colonial basis. Within a year, his plan was begun with the formation of
the American Philosophical Society." 9 Franklin also argued forcefully
in favor of advanced training in the useful arts and sciences by the form-
ation of a college in Pennsylvania. 0 In all of these endeavors, Franklin
displayed his belief in the noble dream of the Enlightenment, that
Man, by studied effort, cbuld unlock the secrets of the universe and apply
them to increase his power "over matter and multiply the conven-
iences or pleasures of life."3"1
As has been shown, science was an integral part of the lives of the
founding fathers. These men incorporated their scientific perspective
and approach into the developing American institutions. By the time
the Declaration of Independence was drafted, science was central to
the thought of many American leaders and provided a mechanism and
intellectual basis for the Revolutionary argument and for the subse-
quent formation of a constitutional government. The founding fathers
also believed that science would provide the information and
technology necessary to advance the material well-being of America's
citizens, allowing them to fully enjoy the liberties secured for them by
their government. During the next century this heritages was not
abandoned: the infant American science began to develop into the
modern giant we know today. Modern American institutions impliedly
demonstrate that inquiry is a right of paramount stature because
science became a part of the very fabric of these institutions.
b. Value to Contemporary Society
In order to achieve the status of a fundamental right, contem-
porary society must highly value scientific inquiry."2 Unlike other
298. In the area of meteorology, Franklin suggested a theory for the movement of air
masses as creating storm fronts, he conducted experiments concerning the actions of ants
and pigeons, made a proposal on the nature of light, and conducted an observation of a
whirlwind. Later while in England he helped Hadley conduct chemical experiments on
evaporation. He also conducted experiments to show how different colors of cloth absorbed
light and the sun's heat. Other scientific efforts included observations and theories concern-
ing geology, and various experiments on the motion of water. Id. at 174-82, 278, 295, 660, 442.
299. Id at 138-41.
300. Franklin drafted a detailed proposal entitled "Proposals Relating to the Educa-
tion of Youth in Pennsylvania" (1743). Id at 189-93.
301. HINDLE, supra note 257, at 1.
302. While there are no cases which expressly mandate this second requirement, it is
the logical consequence of the process that seeks to discover unenumerated rights. This
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claimed liberties such as the right to an abortion or homosexual
rights,"3 scientific inquiry has broad public support and does not
stimulate social abhorrence. Perhaps no single activity is held in
higher esteem by the public than science. 04 The importance of science
is demonstrated by the National Science and Technology Organization
Priorities Act of 1976."O In this Act, Congress acknowledged the pro-
found impact of science on society and the interrelation of scientific,
economic, social, political, and institutional factors and declared that:
"the general welfare, the security, the economic health and stability of
the Nation, the conservation and efficient utilization of its natural and
human resources, and the effective functioning of government and
society require vigorous, perceptive support and employment of
science and technology in achieving national objectives .... -06
Congress specifically found that science "when properly fostered,
applied, and directed, can effectively assist in improving the quality of
life," in resolving critical problems, in strengthening the Nation's inter-
national economic position, and in furthering foreign policy objectives. 7
Congress also found that federal funding of science was indispensable
to sustained national progress and human betterment.0
Not only has Congress recognized that science has been important
to our society, but it has turned to science to help solve national prob-
lems. Congress has stated:
The six broad national goals to which science and technology are
called upon to contribute are (1) those of foreign policy, (2) a healthy
national economy, (3) the special needs of food and energy, (4) the na-
tional security in its broadest sense, (5) the national health, and (6) a
satisfying total environment, natural and man-made, urban and rural.M
Science can effect foreign policy in a number of different ways. It
has been recognized that technology transfer (the by-product of
science) plays an important role in establishing relations with the
element of the test may be an important factor in the Court's subjective decision to grant
certiorari. Lupu, supra note 237, at 1047-50.
303. Id- at 1046.
304. Evidence of surveys conducted in 1972, 1974, and 1976 indicates that the public
continues to have an overwhelmingly positive general reaction to science and technology.
The public's esteem for scientists in 1976 was second only to its esteem for physicians.
Seventy-one percent of the populace consider that science and technology have changed
life for the better. Only seven percent consider the change to have been for the worse.
Contrary to Fears, Public is High on Science, 199 SCIENCE 1420-23 (1978).
305. 42 U.S.C §§ 6601-6671 (1976, Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(1).
307. Id. § 6601(a)(3).
308. Id. § 6601(a)(4).
309. H.R. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 880, 908.
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Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China. 1
Foreign policy goals can also be furthered by the creation and
severance of scientific ties.11 Finally, science can be a component of the
aid provided to third world countries. 12
The national economy is dependent upon a vigorous science pro-
gram. Over sixty-billion dollars per year is expended by the govern-
ment and private sector on basic research, applied research, and
development."' Science is an increasingly indispensable source of im-
provement to the entire economy.3" ' The knowledge gained by scientific
inquiry engenders inventions, techniques, and processes that produce
innovations and efficiencies throughout our economic and social
systems.3 5 This broad-based technology in turn generates the abun-
dance of material goods and services that support the high standard of
living in the United States.1
Science also is important at a more fundamental level. Were it not
for the significant achievements of the agricultural scientist, society's
ability to feed itself would be in jeopardy. Some of the breakthroughs
include the development of high-yield, disease-resistant varieties of
plants; chemical and biological control of weeds, pests, and diseases;
and the genetic control of livestock production. 31 7 If world population
310. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE (Nov.
1979).
311. As part of the normalization of relations between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China, a five-year umbrella agreement delineating rules for
cooperative research and scientific exchanges has been signed. U.S.-Sino Agreements on
Science, 115 Sci. NEWS 83 (1979).
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Council of the National Academy
of Science voted to suspend all symposia, seminars, and workshops for a period of six
months. NAS Cuts Soviet Tie, 117 Sci. NEws 135 (1980).
312. The United States, through NASA, made available a communications satellite to
India so that programs on family planning, agriculture, and adult education could be
broadcast to 4000 Indian villages. U.S. Discusses Progress and Challenges in Space
Technology and Law in U.N. Outer Space Committee, DEP*T STATE BULL. 206, 207
(1976).
313. For the 1981 federal budget, the administration has proposed $50 billion for basic
research and another $36 billion for research and development. 117 ScI. NEWS 70 (1980). In
addition, at least another $20 billion per year will be spent by the private sector. It has
been estimated that each person engaged in research and development (R&D) generates
six to ten other jobs in the economy. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, APPLICATIONS OF
R&D IN THE CIVIL SECTOR (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as APPLICATIONS OF R&D].
314. Rosenburg, The Role of Science and Technology in the National Development of
the United States, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151-63 (W. Beranek
& G. Ranis eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rosenburg].
315. See APPLICATIONS OF R&D, supra note 313, at iii.
316. See Daniels, Science and Human Welfare, in SCIENCE AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
201-02 (F. Crosson ed. 1967); Rosenburg, supra note 314, at 151-63.
317. Pickstock, Food Resources and Population, in SCIENCE FACT 416 (F. George ed.
1978).
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continues to increase, science must continue to innovate to provide
adequate food supply. 18
Energy is one of the most difficult problems facing society. 19 All
currently available energy sources suffer from severe limitations. Fos-
sil fuels are finite and will eventually be exhausted; fission energy pro-
duces hazardous waste and the risk of nuclear disasters.2 0 Modern
society is dependent upon science to discover alternative energy
sources.
3 21
National security also is heavily dependent on science. Beginning
with World War II science has played increasing role in national
defense.32 2  Modern warfare relies heavily on technologically
sophisticated weapons." A scientific breakthrough in weapons de-
velopment by one country can give it an overwhelming superiority
over another. Without a strong commitment to scientific research the
defense posture of the United States could be greatly weakened.
The role of science in medicine has greatly expanded in the past
decades. 2' As a result of the application of the knowledge gained from
scientific inquiry, many new preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic
tools are currently available." Through the use of antibiotics, vaccines,
318. Id. at 414-47. Some areas which may produce significant breakthroughs include
developing man-made plants, developing self-fertilizing plants, new sources of food for
animals, and intensive horticulture.
319. Cohen observes:
The key to such a technology must be cheap and abundant energy. With cheap and
abundant energy and a reasonable degree of inventiveness man can find substitutes
for nearly anything: virtually unlimited quantities of iron and aluminum for metals,
hydrogen for fuels and so on. Without cheap and abundant energy the options are
much narrower and must surely lead back to a quite primitive existence.
Cohen, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste from Fission Reactors, SCIENTIFIC AM., June
1977, at 31.
320. Ausness, High-Level Radioactive Waste Management. The Nuclear Dilemma,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 707, 711.
321. Science may find an answer to the energy crisis in such areas as fission power,
solar energy, or wind power. Conway, Energy in SCIENCE FACT 383-99 (F. George ed.
1978). The solution may be found in some unforeseeable area such as alcohol-producing
bacteria. 116 SCI. NEWS 317 (1979).
322. The premier example was the Manhattan project which developed the first
atomic bomb. LAPP, supra note 19, at 45-55.
323. These weapons include: ICBM missile armed with MIRV warheads, anti-ballistic
missile systems, laser weapons, satellite reconaissance and surveillance systems, and
chemical and biological warfare agents. Archer, Defense and Weapons Research and
Development in SCIENCE FACT 210-23 (F. George ed. 1978).
324. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (Sept. 1978).
325. During the past three decades, there has been a remarkable growth in the
development and use of diagnostic technologies. A wide array of new devices has been
developed, greatly extending the ability to diagnose medical problems. New technologies
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and other techniques, diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, typhoid,
tuberculosis, measles, and poliomyelitis have been virtually eliminated2 26
In addition, relief of pain, amelioration of symptoms, and rehabilitation
are now possible for many persons who previously could not have been
treated at all. These and many other advances have led to a substan-
tial improvement in American public health.
In the future it is expected that science will provide new insights into
such areas as aging, fetal development, the human mind, deciphering
the genetic code, cancer, and heart disease."2
As can be seen from foregoing examples, science and its products
have a profound impact on such diverse areas of our society as foreign
policy, economics, and national defense. Nevertheless, the influence of
science is even more pervasive. The scientific approach has been
adopted by many of our institutions as the basic model for decision
making. All branches of the federal government rely upon the scien-
tific approach in carrying out their assigned functions.
Congress has recognized the importance of employing science and
scientific knowledge in the decision-making process." In areas such as
air pollution control, handling of toxic substances, and operation of
fisheries, Congress has mandated that the administrative agencies use
scientific information as part of their regulatory activities."
In order to insure continuous access to scientific information for
itself, Congress has found it necessary to provide for official scientific
advisors through the creation of the Office of Technology
include automated clinical laboratory equipment, electronic fetal monitoring, am-
niocentesis, electrocardiography (EKG), electroencephalography (EEG), fiberoptic en-
doscopy of the upper and lower gastrointestinal tracts, ultrasound, mammography, and
computed tomography. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHY SCANNER 3-4 (August, 1978).
326. Without the basic research which discovered the three antigenic types of
poliovirus, for example, the development of the Salk vaccine would not have been possi-
ble. Thomas, Hubris in Science? 200 SCIENCE 1459, 1461 (1978).
327. Newell, Medicine and Surgery: To 2001, in SCIENCE FACT 70-106 (F. George ed.
1978).
328. National Science and Technology Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(2) (1976).
329. In the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the EPA is directed to establish a na-
tional research and development program. 42 U.S.C § 7403 (Supp. 1I 1979). In setting the
national air pollution standards the administrator must take into account the latest scien-
tific knowledge. Id. § 7408(b). Under the Toxic Substance Control Act, if the Adminstrator
believes a substance presents an unreasonable risk, the substance may be subjected to a
battery of tests for conditions including carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis,
behavioral disorders, and cumulative or synergistic effects. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976). In
order to protect the national resource of fisheries, Congress has required the development
of a fisheries management plan which makes extensive use of the biological and ecological
sciences. 16 U.S.C § 1853 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
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Assessment.3" Congress has also provided the President with scientific
advisors through the creation of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy. 31 In addition to these internal advisory bodies, the government
also has access to the resources of the nation's scientific community
through the National Science Foundation.
311
In addition to the acquisition of scientific information, all branches
of government employ scientific methodology to varying degrees in
carrying out their functions. The executive branch places an increasing
reliance upon the scientific method in carrying out its responsibilities.
In fact, the work of the executive branch of government has been
described as the science of public administration.$w A major component
of the executive function is decision making and the steps employed in
the executive decision-making process closely parallel those of the
scientific method.' Theodore Sorensen, advisor to President John F.
Kennedy has described the mechanics of White House decision making
as follows:
330. The congressional findings and declaration of purpose in the Act which created
the Office of Technology Assessment state:
(b) Therefore, it is essential that, to the fullest extent possible, the consequences
of technological applications be anticipated, understood, and considered in deter-
mination of public policy on existing and emerging national problems.
(d) Accordingly, it is necessary for the Congress to-
(1) equip itself with new and effective means for securing competent, unbiased in-
formation concerning the physical, biological, economic, social, and political effects
of such applications ....
2 U.S.C. § 471 (1976). For a discussion of the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, see
Hanslowe & Oberer, Science, Technology, Law: The Good Life, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32
(1973).
331. The function of this advisor is to "advise the President of scientific and
technological considerations involved in areas of national concern including, but not
limited to, the economy, national security, health, foreign relations, [and] the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6613 (1976).
332. 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
333. The science of public administration has been described as follows:
Administration has to do with getting things done; with the accomplishment of
defined objectives. The science of administration is thus the system of knowledge
whereby men may understand relationships, predict results, and influence out-
comes in any situation where men are organized at work together for a common
purpose. Public administration is that part of the science of adminstration which
has to do with government, and thus concerns itself primarily with the executive
branch, where the work of government is done, though there are obviously ad-
ministrative problems also in connection with the legislative and judicial branches.
Public administration is thus a division of political science, and one of the social
sciences.
Gulick, Science, Values and the Public Administration, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 98 (L. Gawthrop ed. 1970).
334. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
1981 Scientific Inquiry 725
first: agreement on the facts;
second: agreement on the overall policy objective;
third: a precise definition of the problem;
fourth: a canvassing of all possible solutions, with all their shades
of variations;
fifth: a list of all the possible consequences that would flow
from each solution;
sixth: a recommendation and final choice of one alternative;
seventh: the communication of that selection; and
eight: provision for its execution.m s
As can be seen, these steps include data gathering, data analysis, form-
ulation of hypotheses, the drawing of conclusions, communication and
finally experimentation, which is analogous to the implementation of
the decision."5
Although the decision-making process in Congress is more complex,
it too incorporates many of the basic elements of the scientific ap-
proach. The committee structure, which is the beginning point for con-
gressional action, performs the data gathering and much of the
preliminary analysis.3 37 From the preliminary work of the committees,
Congress formulates a hypothesis in the form of a bill. This bill, when
enacted and implemented as a statute becomes an experiment to test
the hypothesis. Depending upon the results of the experiment there
may be further amendments of the statute.'
335, T. SORENSEN, DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 18-19 (1963). Sorensen notes
that this theoretically ideal process is subject to limitations. Id at 22-42.
336. See text accompanying note 103 supra. The scientific approach was used by the
Johnson administration in connection with a budget system. The program was developed
to enable the government to:
1. Identify our national goals with precision and on a continuing basis;
2. Choose among those goals the ones that are most urgent;
3. Search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at the
least cost;
4. Inform ourselves not merely on next year's cost, but on the second, and third,
and subsequent years' costs of our programs;
5. Measure the performance of our programs to insure a dollar's worth of service
for each dollar spent.
Johnson, A Statement by the President, in THE ADMINISTRATION PROCESS AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 8 (L. Gawthrop ed. 1970).
337. F. CUMMINGS. CAPITOL HILL MANUAL 39-58 (1976); M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 416-43 (1977).
338. This would appear to be the basic approach of Congress in dealing with the social
and environmental issues of the 1960's-70's. This is not to suggest that other factors, politicial,
emotional or economical, etc. did not help shape the final outcomes, but the methodology
was scientific. In the case of the Clean Air Act, the basic act was passed in 1970 (Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676) and was subsequently amended in 1973 (Pub. L. No. 93-15, 87
Stat. 11), 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246), and 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685).
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In addition to the concepts of scientific public adminstration, ad-
ministrative agencies are also subject to the Adminstrative Procedure
Act."s Through the judicial review provisions of the Act, Congress has,
in effect, required all agencies to employ the scientific method in their
decision making." °
The scientific approach to decision making has been so widely used
in this society over such a long period of time that it is sometimes
forgotten that an indentifiable, unique process has been adopted. Alter-
natives for decision making are also available: intuition or political in-
stinct, political doctrine or religious faith, tradition, and personal feelings,
for example.
Governmental decisions based on religious faith occur routinely in
the Middle East. Perhaps the most extreme example is the recent Iran-
ian Constitution which puts all political decisions into the hands of
religious leaders."1 Tradition can also affect government policy and
decision making. The official policy of apartheid, followed by the South
African government, for example, is based substantially upon tradition
rather than scientific reasoning.342 Politicial decisions also are made on
the basis of intuition and feelings3 3 or upon whim.344
Science is largely responsible for many of the values which we accept
339. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
340. The APA states that in judicial review a court shall:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence ...
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Id. § 706.
341. The new constitution is based on strict Moslem law proclaimed in the Koran.
"Key to the clergy's control is a Council of Guardians made up of religious leaders who
must approve measures passed by the Assembly." For the first time Moslem Mullahs are
given complete domination over Islamic life. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 1979, at 22.
342. For many years in most countries Blacks were thought of as inferior. This tradi-
tion is still alive today in South Africa. THE NATION, Aug. 11, 1979, at 104.
343. For example, Communist China's recent "cultural revolution" appears to have
been produced by Chairman Mao's fears of the rising intelligentsia. A. Topping, Since
1966, A Kaleidoscope of Changes, in REPORT FROM RED CHINA 162-65 (F. Ching ed. 1971). S.
Topping, New Dogma, New Maoist Man, in REPORT FROM RED CHINIA 258-65 (F. Ching ed.
1971).
344. One Western diplomat described Uganda's Idi Amin as "animal-shrewd-like a
cornered animal who made political decisions instinctively." NEWSWEEK. Mar. 7, 1977, at
29-35. During his regime Amin seemed content to allow ruination as long as his personal
authority remained undiminished. AMERICA. Jan. 15, 1977, at 26-27.
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today as permanent and self-evident." We are living in a society
permeated by the scientific outlook and ethic." The primary compo-
nent of the scientific ethic is the habit of truth; i.e., the habit of testing
and correcting a concept by its consequences in experience.," From the
habit of truth and the scientific spirit have come such values as
respect for the individual, acceptance of the process of dissent, and
recognition of the value of freedom of thought and inquiry.3 8
In summary, scientific inquiry is of vital importance to our modern
society.349 Science has a profound impact on all of our economic, social,
and political institutions. It is a significant factor in solving many of to-
day's national problems. Science is directly responsible for the material
well-being and strength of our nation. The knowledge gained from
scientific inquiry consistently has been applied to all levels of our
society. The scientific method has been adopted by the government as
a basis for carrying out its various functions. Finally, the scientific
ethic has helped shape the values of our society.
Without science and scientific inquiry the founding fathers' goals for
individual and national self-fulfillment would have been far more dif-
ficult to achieve. Scientific inquiry, from both a historical standpoint
and a modern perspective, is an activity of paramount stature and thus
entitled to protection as a fundamental right.
C. Standards of Review
Assuming that scientific inquiry is a constitutionally protected right,
there remains the critical task of developing the proper standard of
345. HUMAN VALUES. supra note 20, at 51.
346. ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE. supra note 21, at 133.
347. This habit of truth was suggested by Bronowski.
In science and in art and in self-knowledge we explore and move constantly by
turning to the world of sense to ask "Is this so?" This is the habit of truth, always
minute yet always urgent, which for four hundred years has entered every action
of ours; and has made our society and the value it sets on man, as surely as it has
made the linotype machine and the scout knife, and King Lear and the Origin of
Species and Leonardo's Lady with a Stoat.
HUMAN VALUES. supra note 20, at 46.
348. See generally id at 20. "Science like the arts or literature, is necessary to a free
society. It establishes a method of intelligent thought and thereby enhances liberty. It
dignifies the human spirit, as do art and poetry. Scientific inquiry is an expression of
freedom." Rieser, The Role of Science in the Orwellian Decade, 184 SCIENCE 486, 489
(1974).
349. Science is also the greatest hope of the human race.
[T]he heritage of science is a heritage of hope. By greater understanding, not only
of the physical and biological worlds but also of ourselves and the world of human
society, we can push the evolutionary parameters toward human betterment and
build a happier world for the human race even out of the fires of catastrophe.
Boulding, Science: Our Common Heritage, 207 SCIENCE 831, 836 (1980).
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review. Because of the wide variety of fact situations in which the
rights beyond those enumerated in the Constitution arise, no one stan-
dard of review has been articulated25 Depending upon the particular
right involved, the standard of review ranges from requiring merely a
rational basis,351 to requiring an important state interest"' or a compel-
ling interest3 1 to justify state interference. It appears that the ap-
plicability of the different tests is a function of the nature of the right
asserted and the context in which it arises." The more socially signifi-
cant the right, the stricter the standard of review.
In light of the important role which scientific inquiry plays in the
functioning of our society it would be inappropriate to employ the ra-
tional basis standard. Under this standard a government regulation
will be upheld if it furthers a legitimate governmental objective. 55
350. Professor Tribe has observed:
The resulting rights have been located in the "liberty" protected by the due pro-
cess clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. They have been cut from the
cloth of the ninth amendment-conceived as a rule against cramped construc-
tion-or from the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV and of the four-
teenth amendment. Encompassing rights to shape one's inner life and rights to control
the face one presents to the world, they have materialized like holograms from the
"emanations" and "penumbras"-most recently dubbed simply the "shadows"-of
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. They elaborate the "blessings of
liberty" promised in the Preamble, and have been held implicit in the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Wherever located,
they have inspired among the most moving appeals to be found in the judicial lexicon.
TRIBE, supra note 46, at 893-94 (footnotes omitted).
351. In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), the Court upheld a regulation governing
hair grooming for police officers since the patrolman involved could not demonstrate that
there was no rational connection between the regulation and the goal of promoting safety
of persons and property. Id. at 247.
352. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494 (1977), the court held that
because the city's zoning ordinance intruded upon the fundamental rights of the family
the usual judicial deference to the legislature was inappropriate. The Court stated that
"when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and
the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Id. at 499.
353. See notes 202-07 and accompanying text supra. See generally Lupu, note 237
supra; Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited. Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. L. REv. 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Perry]; Perry, Abortion, The Public
Morals, and the Police Power. The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976).
354. An example of this distinction is provided by Tribe:
Thus a purpose adequate to justify regulating the quality of brake linings might not
serve to justify requiring the wearing of seat belts. And one sufficient to justify
such a requirement might in turn be thought insufficient to sustain a requirement
targeted at a more insular group-motorcyclists, for example, instead of automobile
drivers.
TRIBE, supra note 46, at 891.
355. Perry, supra note 353 at 419, 422.
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With this test almost "any governmental objective is legitimate which
seeks to protect psychological, as well as physical, health or to pro-
mote the economic, political, or even aesthetic well being of the
citizenry."3'- This test leaves very little room for weighing the impor-
tance of the claimed right against the governmental objective. Even
more importantly, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish
that there is no rational connection between the regulation and the
state interest.5 ' Because of the important role which scientific inquiry
plays both in the individual self-fulfillment of the scientist and the
development of society, the rational basis test is insufficient to protect
the right of scientific inquiry.
Given the fundamental nature of the right of scientific inquiry a
more strict standard is required. When dealing with fundamental or
basic rights the Court has required that there be a substantial, impor-
tant, or compelling state interest. Furthermore, when these rights are
involved the burden falls upon the state to demonstrate that there is a
sufficient interest and the regulation is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests. 58 The standard would require that the regulation
(1) be within the constitutional power of the government, (2) further
an important or substantial governmental interest, and (3) be no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental inter-
est. The standard will permit the fullest possible exercise of the basic
right of scientific inquiry while still allowing the state to protect itself
and the health and safety of its citizens.
This standard should be used in all cases in which the state seeks to
regulate scientific inquiry. In the first instance the activity involved
must satisfy the two-part definition of scientific inquiry. 59 Once the
claimant establishes that the activity is scientific inquiry, the burden
shifts to the government to establish that its regulation meets the re-
quirements of the three-point fundamental right standard. The stan-
dard is essentially the same as the O'Brien test.6 Because of this
similarity, the analysis of any case will follow the same pattern as that
of the O'Brien test. Thus the results reached in the above examples of
the fetal research, recombinant DNA, national security, and human ex-
perimentation will be the same.
356. Id. at 424 (footnotes omitted).
357. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. at 247. Using this approach it would be possible for a
local government to prevent the construction of a large solar collector which would be
used to study the fundamental characteristics of energy conversion by solar cells. The
local government could justify the regulation based on aesthetic and potential traffic con-
gestion due to sightseers. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
358. This test was set forth in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978), where the
Court struck down a statute which interfered with the fundamental right of marriage.
359. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
360. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Science and its products have already exerted a profound impact
on society and will continue to do so. As scientific knowledge grows, so
does man's ability to affect and manipulate himself and his environ-
ment. The changes and the risks created by scientific inquiry will in-
evitably lead to a greater demand for governmental control. This article
proposes various approaches which can be used to balance the right of
scientific inquiry and the state's interest in protecting itself and its
citizens.
Before meaningful regulation is possible, the nature of scientific in-
quiry must be more fully understood. Its goals and methods must be
examined to determine which activities can be properly designated as
scienfitic inquiry. Based upon this examination, the authors have pro-
posed a legal definition of scientific inquiry.
Once the nature of scientific inquiry is examined, it is possible
to establish a constitutional right to engage in this activity either
under the first amendment analysis or as a fundamental right standing
alone. The first amendment approach offers the advantage of allowing
analysis to proceed along familiar, well traveled paths, but it presents
the disadvantage of not accomodating the unique character of scientific
inquiry and of requiring that certain of its non-speech components be
characterized as speech or incidents of speech. The "Achilles Heel" of
the first amendment approach lies in its requirement that experimen-
tation must be categorized as speech or necessary incident of speech.
If this categorization is not accepted, the whole analysis falls apart.
The fundamental right approach, while having the disadvantage of be-
ing novel, offers the advantage of fitting readily within the mold of
presently recognized fundamental rights. The latter approach is
preferable. Because it accommodates the unique character of science, it
allows the Court to deal directly with scientific inquiry without resort-
ing to artificial characterization. This approach will also allow the
Court maximum flexibility in dealing with the complex issues which
will inevitably arise. Whichever approach is adopted, the standard of
review and analysis would be equivalent.
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